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MAKING FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA WORK
PROPERLY: OBSERVATIONS AND
PROPOSALS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF WAIVER OF COUNSEL INQUIRIES
MICHAEL J. KELLY1
INTRODUCTION
In 2001, Benjamin Egwaoje walked into several Chicago-area
banks and attempted to withdraw cash using several credit cards
he received by less-than-lawful means. 2 He was arrested several
weeks later when a bank teller recognized him and noticed that
he was using different cards with different names than on his
prior visit. 3 Before his trial in April 2002, Egwaoje went through
a number of attorneys and continuously requested to have an
unusually speedy trial, which did not give his attorneys enough
time to prepare his defense. 4 On the morning of his trial, he fired
I J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2006; B.A. Philosophy,
magna cum laude (with departmental honors), Fordham University, May 2003. The
author would like to thank his friends and family for their tireless support and the staff
and editors of the Journal of Legal Commentary for their efforts in making this piece fit
for publication. The author would also like to thank Katherine Alteneder, Esq. for
instilling in him the pro se spirit.
2 See United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating Egwaoje
netted $39,000 in that scheme); see also Adina Matusow, Court Considers Risk of Self-
Representation: Case Led by Kenneth Starr Asks Justices to Give Trial Courts the Chance
to Appoint Defense Counsel When Appropriate, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at 8
(detailing circumstances surrounding Egwaoje's arrest).
3 See Egwaoje, 335 F.3d at 581 (stating bank teller stalled Egwaoje at bank until
police arrived).
4 Id. at 581-82. Several of Egwaoje's attorneys withdrew from the case because of
irreparable conflicts between them and Egwaoje. Id. Egwaoje, knowing that his attorneys
could not have enough time to prepare for the trial, kept demanding that he receive a
speedy trial. Id. The court on multiple occasions reminded him that his attorneys needed
to prepare for trial, and set numerous court dates. Id. Upon Egwaoje's request to have his
second attorney replaced, Judge Zagel warned Egwaoje that he would not necessarily give
him an attorney that would agree with him, and that he was not sure whether Egwaoje
even had a viable defense. See Brief for Respondent at 4, Egwaoje v. United States, 541
U.S. 958 (2004) (No. 03-691).
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his final attorney and informed the court that he wanted to
represent himself.5 The court warned him of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation and permitted him to
present his defense. 6 At his trial, he called no witnesses,
presented no evidence in his defense, and was later convicted. 7
The Seventh Circuit affirmed Egwaoje's conviction after he
appealed and claimed that he was improperly denied the right to
counsel.8 The Court of Appeals here found that he had made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.9 The court
came to the conclusion that, although there was no formal
inquiry into Egwaoje's ability to waive his right to counsel, it was
more important to show that Egwaoje understood the situation
he was getting himself into. The court found that such a showing
was made because the trial judge ensured that Egwaoje knew the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.O Using a
5 See Egwaoje, 335 F.3d at 583. On the morning of the trial, Egwaoje requested a
sixty-day continuance to prepare for trial. The judge denied this request. Upon hearing
this, Egwaoje stated that he wished to proceed pro se. Id. Judge Zagel stated to Egwaoje,
"I have set the schedule. I have seen in you a course of conduct that has been nothing but
an attempt to frustrate the government's effort to bring you to trial, to play games, to
demand a speedy trial, and then demand a continuance." Respondents' Brief at 4,
Egwaoje (No. 03-691).
6 Egwaoje, 335 F.3d at 583-84. The court stated that Egwaoje was being foolish by
representing himself. Id. at 584. In fact, the judge stated that he was required to
"admonish" Egwaoje. See Respondents' Brief at 4, Egwaoje (No. 03-691). Halpern,
Egwaoje's attorney at the time, agreed to stay as standby counsel. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d at
584.
7 See United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing
procedure of proceeding). See generally Torres v. United States, 140 F.3d 392, 395 (2d Cir.
1998) (convicting defendant even though she refused "the appointment of counsel,
demanded to represent herself and then informed the district court that she would
neither present a defense nor participate in the proceedings"); People v. Clark, 789 P.2d
127, 150 (Cal. 1990) (holding "the defendant has the right to present no defense and to
take the stand and both confess guilt and request imposition of the death penalty").
8 See Egwaoje, 335 F.3d at 589 (affirming both defendant's conviction and sentence);
Patricia Manson, Court: Man Had 'Fool'for a Lawyer - Self, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 10,
2003, at 1 (reporting "[tlhe 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected arguments
Wednesday that Benjamin Egwaoje was denied his constitutional right to an attorney
when he was allowed to defend himself at trial"). See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389, 399 (1993) (finding "the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to
waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to
represent himself").
9 See Egwaoje, 335 F.3d at 585 (concluding Egwaoje's waiver was made "knowingly
and intelligently" due to totality of circumstances surrounding it); Manson, supra note 8,
at 1 (noting that Egwaoje understood predicament which he was entering); see also
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (finding technical legal knowledge not to be
relevant to assessment of defendant's "knowing exercise" of right to defend himself).
10 See Egwaoje, 335 F.3d at 586 (noting that defendant's criminal history "bears upon
the defendant's understanding of the risks involved and the nature of the charges brought
against him").
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totality of circumstances approach, the court held that Egwaoje
made such a knowing and intelligent waiver, thus effectively
waiving his right to counsel." Upon this finding, the court
affirmed his conviction. 12 The Supreme Court denied Egwaoje's
petition for certiorari on the issue of whether courts may force a
defendant to accept counsel (thereby not re-examining the
Court's decision in Faretta v. California, discussed herein).13
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the persistent
question of how a trial judge is to conduct a waiver of counsel
inquiry was left unanswered.14 It is well settled that a criminal
defendant has the right to waive counsel, so long as that waiver
is knowing and intelligent.15 The controversies currently in
dispute, however, are whether a trial judge needs to provide a
defendant with a warning of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, whether the court's decision as to the validity
of a defendant's waiver should take place in a formal setting, and
what role standby counsel has with regard to this question.16
11 See Egwaoje, 335 F.3d at 586 (holding that Egwaoje's behavior shows that he made
knowing and intelligent waiver).
12 See Egwaoje, 335 F.3d at 581 (affirming conviction).
13 See United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 124 S. Ct.
1712 (2004).
14 See Adina Matusow, Court May Re-Examine Defendant's' Right to Self-
Representation, N.J. L.J., Mar. 15, 2004 (noting that circuits are split on whether trial
court, while deciding on defendant's waiver request, should conduct formal inquiry). See
generally Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld & Sheri Klintworth, Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: Introduction and Guide for Users: III. Trial: Right to Counsel, 89 GEO. L.J.
1485, 1493-94 (2001) (discussing holding in Faretta that "the judge's failure to hold a
waiver hearing, however, may not be sufficient error to warrant reversal, particularly if
the trial record otherwise demonstrates a knowing and intelligent waiver"); Frederic Paul
Gallun, Note, The Sixth Amendment Paradox: Recent Developments on the Right to Waive
Counsel Under Faretta, 23 N.E. J. ON CRIM. & CiV. CON. 559, 601 n.63 (1997) (noting
"seven circuits follow the 'record as a whole approach,' and five circuits follow the 'formal
inquiry approach"').
15 See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (stating that "waiver of the right to counsel,
as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, must be a 'knowing,
intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances"') (quoting
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835
(1975) (stating accused must "knowingly and intelligently" forego benefits associated with
right to counsel) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)); Gallun, supra note 14,
at 564 (stating Faretta test is "to ensure that the defendant is literate, competent,
understanding, that he or she knowingly and voluntarily intends to waive his or her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, and that the defendant is aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation").
16 See Matusow, supra note 14 (recognizing 'that courts have been trying to come up
with different ways to apply Faretta's standards in response to Brief by Solicitor General
Theodore Olson); see also Rosenfeld & Klintworth, supra note 14, at 1497 (clarifying that
pro se defendant has "no absolute right to standby counsel, to hybrid representation, or to
access to a law library"). See generally Brian H. Wright, Comment, The Formal Inquiry
Approach: Balancing a Defendant's Right to Proceed Pro se with a Defendant's Right to
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This Note will first lay out in Part I the general history behind
the right to waive counsel at a criminal trial and discuss the
Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California. Part II will
examine the standard of inquiry used in waiver hearings. In
Part III, this Note will discuss the problem of warning a
defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation and will provide a recommendation as to what
extent a judge can give a warning. Part IV will inspect the
methods of deciding whether a defendant can waive her right to
counsel and discuss the dangers and disadvantages in
conjunction with those methods. Finally, Part V will discuss the
role of standby counsel in a waiver decision.
I. SELF-REPRESENTATION IN GENERAL
A. Evolution of the Right to Self-Representation
The right of self-representation has its beginnings in the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.17 In Powell v.
Alabama, 18 the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel, at
least in a state death penalty case, is also subject to the
Assistance of Counsel, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 785, 786 (1993) (advancing "[t]here has been a
split in authority among the appellate courts since Faretta on the question of how to
recognize a defendant's constitutional right to proceed pro se without violating his
constitutional right to counsel").
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. (emphasis added). The Sixth Amendment grants defendants in criminal proceedings
the right to counsel. See id. It has also been construed to require counsel unless such right
has been completely and intelligently waived. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
339-40 (1963). The Supreme Court has read the right to self-representation into the Sixth
Amendment based on the structure of amendment and the "common historical practice of
self representation." John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the
Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 495 (1996).
18 287 U.S. 45, 49-50 (1932) (explaining how three black men were charged with and
convicted of rape in a single day, with sentence of death, which was upheld in face of
claims that defendants were not afforded right to counsel). See Jeffrey Levinson, Note,
Don't let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel,
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 152 (2001) (commenting that although defendants in Powell had
counsel, one was appointed on morning of trial, and other was not a member of the
Alabama bar).
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guarantees made by the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 In Powell, the
judge appointed members of the bar to represent the defendant
at his arraignment and assumed they would stay on for trial,
which they did not.20 The Supreme Court decided that the
defendant, under these circumstances, must be afforded the
proper time to retain his own counsel.21 Ultimately, the Court, in
reviewing that decision, held that the trial judge did nothing
more than provide an "expansive gesture" of representation
without actually providing for counsel.22
Later in Johnson v. Zerbst,2 3 the Court expanded on a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, finding that the
Amendment provides for a waiver of the right to counsel in
federal criminal cases.24 When a defendant requests waiving her
19 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (holding that right to counsel is
fundamental in character for state capital cases); see also Martinez v. Court of Appeal of
California, 528 U.S. 152, 154 (2000) (stating 6th and 14th amendments guarantee counsel
in all criminal cases). See generally Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (expanding principle in Powell
in asserting assistance of counsel is fundamental right incorporated to States through
due process clause of 14th amendment).
20 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 49 (noting record from lower courts reflects that defendants
were represented by counsel at arraignment, although no attorney was hired for them);
see also Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent Defense and Effective
Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435, 437 (2003-04) (explaining although trial court
appointed "all of the members of the bar" to represent defendants at trial, it only
appointed one attorney on morning of trial without opportunity to prepare).
21 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 53 (stating defendant in capital case should be offered "fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice"); F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma
Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the
Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 215 (2002) (noting Powell
established appointed counsel should have time necessary to effectively prepare for trial);
Levinson, supra note 18, at 151 (arguing that right to have lawyer of one's choosing, who
can have enough time to communicate with defendant is essential segment of effective
counsel right that emerged from Powell).
22 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 56-57 (determining trial judge's decision did not create
obligation for any local attorney). See generally Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 (2002)
(noting denial of counsel at "critical stage of the litigation creates a presumption of
complete denial of counsel"); Jenny Roberts, A Conference on New York City's Criminal
Courts: Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and
Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1097, 1106 (2004) (arguing
that in order to have effective representation under 6th amendment, defense counsel
must have duty to investigate defenses and prosecution's potential case).
23 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Petitioners in Zerbst were United States Marines
convicted of passing and possessing counterfeit twenty-dollar bills. Id. at 460. They were
indicted, arraigned, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the same day. Id. They were never
given an opportunity to hire an attorney and were not allowed to present an effective
case. Id. at 460-61.
24 See id. at 465 (reasoning that because Sixth Amendment exists to protect
defendants from their own ignorance of law, it would be ironic for Court to hold that
defendant who is ignorant of his own rights should be denied protection of Constitution);
see also Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon's Shadow: The Loss of Defendant Autonomy
and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 363, 370-71 (2003)
(arguing that although Court extended guarantee of counsel to all indigent criminal
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right to counsel, the judge must make the "weighty" decision of
determining whether the accused has waived the right
intelligently and competently. 25 In addition, if the defendant has
not intelligently and competently waived her right to counsel,
and is not represented by counsel, then any conviction the
defendant has received in that proceeding is implicitly barred by
the Sixth Amendment. 26 The right to make an intelligent waiver
was later recognized in Adams v. United States ex rel McCann,2 7
where the court held that since a defendant can waive her right
to a jury trial, there is no reason why she should not be able to
waive the right to. counsel. 28
The right to waive counsel in a criminal trial was not ratified
as a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment until
thirty-three years later when the Supreme Court decided Faretta
defendants, it subsequently limited this extension to federal courts), But see Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 472-73 (1942) (concluding that Sixth Amendment does not apply to
States because such application would be overly broad and would prevent States from
reflecting "judgment of the people"), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339
(1963).
25 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938) (stating trial judge must
determine whether there has been valid waiver by examining "the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused"); see also People v. Lego, 660 N.E.2d 971, 973 (Ill. 1995) (stating
requirement "calls for nothing less than a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it"); Jennifer W.
Corinis, Note, A Reasoned Standard for Competency to Waive Counsel after Godinez v.
Moran, 80 B.U. L. REV. 265, 268 (2000) (arguing that defendant who makes this waiver is
subject to requirement of higher mental capacity than would be required if proceeding
was with assistance of lawyer).
26 See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 468 (holding that waiver under these circumstances would
violate right of defendant to have assistance of counsel at trial). See generally Alabama v.
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (characterizing principle that no person may be
imprisoned for any offense without representation at trial as "controlling rule");
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972) (explaining that without counsel provided
for indigent defendant, there will be no fair trial, especially considering the "vast sums of
money" expended by State to try defendant).
27 317 U.S. 269 (1942). Here, the court noted that these waivers are subject to
safeguards, such as that the presiding court must be uncoerced with "no interest other
than the pursuit of justice" and the defendant must be afforded time to "meet" the charges
of the State. Id. at 275.
28 See id. at 271-72 (explaining that waiver was valid because defendant signed
waivers to effect that he would represent himself and to consent to trial without jury and,
resultantly, convinced trial judge that he was competent); see also James A. Cohen, The
Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules, and the Impaired Criminal Defendant, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 529, 577-78 (1998) (noting deciding how to plead and whether to waive
right against self-incrimination is up to defendant in criminal proceedings); Brian H.
Wright, Comment, The Formal Inquiry Approach: Balancing A Defendant's Right to
Proceed Pro se with A Defendant's Right to Assistance of Counsel, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 785,
788 (1993) (noting that original issue of appeal is centered around defendants' ability to
waive jury trial in criminal proceeding).
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v. California.29 Describing the right to waive counsel as a right
"correlative" to the rights found in the Sixth Amendment, the
Court determined that a defendant may waive his or her right to
counsel, with the caveats that the choice be knowing and
intelligent and that the choice be approved by the court.30 The
right to self-representation has since been extended to other
parts of the criminal adversarial process. 31
B. The Faretta Decision
In Faretta v. California, Anthony Faretta was charged with
grand theft.32 At his trial, Faretta requested that he dispense
with his assigned public defender and represent himself. 33
Faretta reasoned that the public defender's office had a heavy
caseload and would not give much attention into his case. 34 The
hesitant judge granted Faretta's request.35 However, later in the
trial, the judge raised the issue sua sponte.3 6 After asking
Faretta multiple questions of state law, the judge decided that
Faretta had not made a knowing and intelligent decision to
29 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding right of self representation as implied in 6th
amendment and is incorporated to States through Due Process Clause of 14th
Amendment).
30 See id. at 814 (stating 6th Amendment entails "correlative right to dispense with a
lawyer's help") (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
But see Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (explaining that competency required to
waive right to counsel in criminal proceedings is not based on capability of defendant to
represent himself, but on his ability to knowingly make waiver); Fred C. Zacharias,
Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199, 202 (2001)
(noting that criminal defendant who does proceed pro se can freely violate rules of
professional conduct for lawyers).
31 See e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88-89 (2004) (stating that defendant in
criminal proceeding can proceed pro se when entering guilty plea, but court does not have
obligation to warn defendant of dangers of self representation); Alabama v. Shelton, 535
U.S. 654, 672 (2002) (holding if defendant is deprived of assistance of counsel during trial,
no sentence can be given); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 (1988) (holding that
defendant's awareness of her Miranda rights is sufficient for waiver of counsel in post-
indictment questioning).
32 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (noting that defendant was charged
with grand theft in Superior Court of county of Los Angeles).
33 Id. (explaining defendant had previously represented himself in another criminal
proceeding, and wanted to represent himself because of heavy caseload of public
defender).
34 Id. at 807 (stating that Faretta thought defender's office was "loaded down"); see
also Teresa A. Scott, Recent Development, The Role of Standby Counsel: The Road from
Faretta to Wiggins, 27 HOW. L.J. 1799, 1801 (1984) (explaining Faretta's opinion as to
why public defender would be ineffective).
35 Faretta, 422 U.S at 808 (granting Faretta's request).
36 Farreta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 808 (1975) (noting that hearing was held two
weeks later).
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waive counsel and, additionally ruled that there was no
constitutional right to self-representation. 37 Faretta was later
tried with a public defender as counsel and was subsequently
convicted. 38  The California Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction.39
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case. 40 In his
majority opinion, Justice Stewart mainly relied upon historical
grounds to find a basis for a constitutional right to self-
representation.41 Before the United States was founded, the
general practice of the colonies was to allow defendants to
represent themselves. 42 After the American Revolution, the new
states added the right to self-representation to their constitutions
in "wholesale fashion."43 The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that
defendants be able to conduct their own defense or use an
attorney.44 Only one day after the Act of 1789 was passed, the
37 Farreta, 422 U.S. at 808-11 & n.3 (depicting circumstances surrounding reversal of
judge's prior ruling that Faretta could represent himself).
38 Farreta, 422 U.S. at 811. Justice Stewart indicated that even after counsel was
appointed in this case, Faretta still requested to be his own co-counsel, id. at 810.
39 Farreta, 422 U.S. at 811-12 (affirming conviction based on similarly decided case).
40 Farreta, 422 U.S. at 812 (stating same).
41 See Farreta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 822-32 (1975) (relating history of
assistance of counsel from early English jurisprudence to writing of Sixth Amendment
after ratification of Constitution); see also Scott, supra note 34, at 1801 (noting that Court
relied on historical foundation of 6th Amendment); Meghan H. Morgan, Article, Standby
Me: Self-Representation and Standby Counsel in a Capital Case, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 367, 369-
70 (2004) (recognizing that Court based its decision on long history of British and colonial
jurisprudence from which 6th Amendment emerged).
42 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 828 (stating, "Indeed, even where counsel was permitted,
the general practice continued to be self-representation."); see also Mindy D. Block,
Comment, The Criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Lay Representation, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 460, 471 (1985) (noting that American historical practice was to allow
defendant to represent himself); Eric Rieder, Note, The Right of Self-Representation in the
Capital Case, 85 COLUM. L. REV 130, 137 (1985) (stating that colonies allowed defendant
to choose whether to retain counsel or to represent himself).
43 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 830 (1975) (stating along with right of self
representation came "other rights basic to the making of a defense"); see also Block, supra
note 42, at 468 (stating that many early state charters secured right to self-
representation); Rieder, supra note 42, at 138 (recognizing that many newly drafted state
constitutions protected both defendant's right to retain counsel and to represent himself).
44 See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1654 (2005) (requiring that "[iun all courts of the United States
the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the
rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.");
see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 831 (discussing language of Judiciary Act); Rieder, supra note
42, at 138 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654 as support that freedom to choose between
representation by counsel and self-representation was basic right of free people).
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Sixth Amendment was proposed, evidencing that lawmakers still
had the Act and the right of self-representation on their minds. 45
The Court went further in stating the distinction between the
right to obtaining counsel voluntarily and having counsel forced
upon a defendant.46 The Court noted, "where the defendant will
not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential
advantage of a lawyer's training and experience can be realized,
if at all, only imperfectly."47 After holding that there is a right to
self-representation in the Sixth Amendment, Justice Stewart
continued, in dicta, to state that the defendant must make the
decision to disregard counsel "knowingly and intelligently" and
that the defendant, during an inquiry, "should be made aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation."48
The dissent, authored by Chief Justice Burger, mostly focused
on how the right might be a disadvantage to the defendant.
Burger concluded that the defendant would lose whatever
defense she had if she decided to represent herself. 49 The purpose
of a criminal trial, according to Chief Justice Burger, is to
achieve justice - a purpose that would not be well-served if the
defendant was allowed to represent herself.DO In fact, "the 'spirit
and the logic' of the Sixth Amendment are that every person
accused of crime shall receive the fullest possible defense . . ."51
Finally, Chief Justice Burger suggests that the Judicial Act of
1789 was passed with the right to self-representation because the
45 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 831 (noting time in which 6th amendment was proposed);
Morgan, supra note 41, at 368-69 (proposing because Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted
one day before Sixth Amendment was proposed, it follows the right to represent oneself
has been protected since nation's inception); Jeffrey P. Willhite, Note, Rethinking the
Standards for Waiver of Counsel and Proceeding Pro se in Iowa, 28 IOWA L. REV. 205, 209
(1992) (noting that Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed one day before proposal of Sixth
Amendment).
46 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833 (recognizing difference between right to counsel and
compelling acceptance of counsel); Morgan, supra note 41, at 369 (discussing court's
recognition of difference);
Marie Higgins Williams, Comment, The Pro se Criminal Defendant, Standby Counsel,
and the Judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 799 (2000)
(quoting Court's recognition of difference).
47 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
48 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 838 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing harm of accused conducting trial
for himself).
50 Id. at 839 (arguing prosecutor and judge have duty to ensure justice is achieved
and by allowing self representation, that goal is "ill-served").
51 Id. at 840 (noting that only trial judge is in position to evaluate whether defendant
is capable of representing himself).
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Sixth Amendment was not intended to contain it.52 Thus, it was
intentional that the right was left out of the Sixth Amendment. 53
C. Circuit Court Interpretations After the Faretta Decision
Since the Faretta decision, the various circuits have taken
divergent views on what constitutes a valid waiver of counsel.5 4
Possibly the most restrictive of these circuits is the Sixth Circuit.
In United States v. McBride,55 the court stated that before a
defendant is allowed to waive counsel, the trial judge must ask
the defendant thirteen questions drawn from the BENCH BOOK
FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES.56 A "strongly worded
admonishment" against self-representation is also included in
this procedure. 57 Literal compliance with the standard is not
required, as the Sixth Circuit held that asking twelve out of the
thirteen questions is sufficient. 58 In addition, the Ninth Circuit
52 See id. at 844 (emphasizing distinction between Sixth Amendment and Judiciary
Act in that Sixth Amendment includes right of counsel and Judiciary Act provides right of
self-representation).
53 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 844 (1975) (concluding that this distinction
was intentional).
54 See generally United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2004); United
States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004); Dallio v. Spitzer, 343 F.3d 553 (2d Cir.
2003); United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cassidy, 48
Fed. Appx. 428 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726 (11th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2001); Braun v. Ward, 190 F.3d 1181 (10th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1995); Berry v. Lockhart, 873
F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1976).
55 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004).
56 See United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 366 (6th Cir. 2004) (mandating district
courts to ask questions set forth in BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES);
Bruce A. McGovern, Note, Invalid Waivers of Counsel as Harmless Errors: Judicial
Economy or a Return to Betts v. Brady?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 431, 449-50 (1987)
(explaining how Sixth Circuit uses BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
before procuring valid waivers of counsel); see also Todd A. Pickles, Note, People v. Welch:
A Missed Opportunity to Establish a Rational Rule of Competency to Waive the Assistance
of Counsel, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 603, 607-08 (2000) (discussing different circuits' approaches
to level of competency needed for self-representation).
57 See McBride, 362 F.3d at 366 (holding district court judges responsible for
verbalizing even one strongly word admonishment); see also United States v. McDowell,
814 F.2d 245, 250 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing dialogue and inquiry that must take place
between judge and accused before he or she chooses self-representation); Joseph A.
Colquitt, Hybrid Representation: Standing the Two-Sided Coin on its Edge, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 55, 66-67 (2003) (concluding that courts must ensure that defendants are
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waiving their right to counsel).
58 See McBride, 362 F.3d at 366 (finding twelve out of thirteen questions asked
substantially complied with required inquiry); United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245,
250 (6th Cir. 1987) (ruling that Bench Book would be useful as a guideline in situations
where defendant's seek to waive representation); see also McGovern, supra note 56, at 450
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has held that in order to properly determine the validity of a
waiver, the trial judge must "insure that [the defendant]
understands 1) the nature of the charges against him; 2) the
possible penalties; and 3) the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation,"59 rather than simply suggest that the judge
should do these things.60
While the Ninth Circuit does not require as rigid a formula as
the Sixth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit holds similarly, stating that
it is essential that the defendant be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation. 61 However, the Eight
Circuit asserts, based on a totality of circumstances test,6 2 that if
the defendant has this knowledge from elsewhere, the judge is
not required to give a detailed warning.6 3
Advocating a low standard for waiver validity is the Seventh
Circuit, which holds in United States v. Oreye64 that it is the
judge's responsibility to ensure that the defendant knows his
rights and does not make any "hasty decisions."65 Judge Posner
(explaining inquiry used by Sixth Circuit when utilizing Bench Rules and determining
defendant's self-representation).
59 United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987)).
60 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (recommending that judges
should ensure self-represented defendant has knowledge and makes informed decision);
see also Colquitt, supra note 57, at 66-67 (noting minimal routine inquiry that judge
should perform before making informed decision regarding defendant's self-
representation); Pickles, supra note 56, at 629 (explaining Ninth Circuit's requirements of
psychiatrist evaluation, judge's personal interview with defendant, judge's warning of
disadvantages of defending pro se, and judge's determination of defendant's reasonable
choice before compelling defendant's self-representation).
61 See Berry v. Lockhart, 873 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1989) (ruling that accused
must be made aware of all disadvantages of self-representation); Meyer v. Sargent, 854
F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1988) (offering judges' option to warn of dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation); see also Pickles, supra note 56, at 607 (citing Eighth
Circuit's standard for waiver of counsel).
62 See Berry, 873 F.2d at 1170 (holding record as whole must be reviewed for
circumstances proving knowledge and intelligent waiver of counsel); Meyer, 854 F.2d at
1114 (establishing that courts must take into consideration defendant's circumstances
when making assessment of his or her competence to waive counsel); Decker, supra note
17, at 514 (discussing judicial inquiry of totality of circumstances, including defendant's
background, experience and conduct).
63 See Meyer, 854 F.2d at 1114 (explaining that warning is not always required or
absolute); see also Wright, supra note 16, at 794 (discussing Eighth Circuit's view along
with six other circuits which hold that waiver can be discerned from defendant's
knowledge of circumstances). But see Colquitt, supra note 57, at 65 (highlighting that
defendants are statistically better off with counsel and emphasizing importance of
ensuring proper waiver).
64 263 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2001).
65 See United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, the trial judge
gave Oreye the choice of remaining with his current counsel, finding new counsel who
would be ready to go to trial immediately, or representing himself and keeping his current
256 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:1
states that, though the court must make sure of this, the judge
cannot mandate any kind of warning. 66 The danger of this, as
stated in United States v. Hill,67 is that, if a specific warning
were given, the judge would "depict self-representation in such
unremittingly scary terms that any reasonable person would
refuse."68
The Fourth Circuit states that the trial court must determine
from the record as a whole whether a defendant's waiver was
"knowing and intelligent."69 However, it notes that failure to
grant a waiver where the defendant deserves one is reversible
error. 70 Likewise, the First Circuit espouses the view that a
waiver decision should be made on the case's facts71 and states
that there are no required questions or warnings to determine
whether a waiver is valid.72
Finally, several Circuits walk the fine line between these two
views. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Joseph,73 states that
the defendant should be aware of the dangers and disadvantages
counsel as standby counsel. Id. at 670. The court determined that Oreye did not need to
specifically state that he wanted to represent himself, but such a desire can be inferred
from the defendant's other statements and actions. Id.
66 See Oreye, 263 F.3d at 672 (ruling that judges cannot mandate warning against
right to self-representation because it is defendant's constitutional right).
67 252 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2001).
68 United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 928-29 (7th Cir. 2001).
69 United States v. Cassidy, 48 Fed. Appx. 428, 438 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding waiver
was valid because it was knowing and voluntary).
70 See Cassidy, 48 Fed. Appx. at 438. The court also states that a judge cannot deny a
defendant's waiver request if she believes that the defendant would benefit from the
assistance of counsel. In Cassidy, defendant was given time to hire his own counsel and
failed to do so. Id. at 437. Thus, his waiver was properly denied even though the court did
not give him any time to prepare a pro se defense. Id. Notably, other courts have failed to
find reversible error because the defendant's waiver was valid. See United States v.
Melvin, 48 Fed. Appx. 63 (4th Cir. 2002). In fact, a court's refusal to accept a valid waiver
of counsel has been considered reversible error. See generally Nineteenth Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1988-1989:
III. Trial (Part 1 of 2) 78 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1085-86 (1990).
71 See United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 845 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that when
determining whether waiver of counsel is valid, court should look to totality of "particular
facts and circumstances surrounding the case"); Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278
(1st Cir. 1976) (emphasizing importance of all facts and circumstances of case); see also
Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 183 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (demanding that facts
in record "should not be ignored if justice demands their use").
72 See United States v. Manjarrez, 306 F.3d 1175, 1179 (1st Cir. 2002)
(acknowledging First Circuit's more contextual approach to evaluating waiver of counsel);
Campbell, 874 F.2d at 845 (stating that First Circuit has not construed earlier cases to
require particular technical inquiry); Meachum, 545 F.2d at 279 (adopting less technical
approach).
73 333 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 2003).
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of self-representation, 74 but that the trial judge's decision may
come from a consideration of the defendant's age, experience,
education and background. 75 In United States v. Kimball,76 the
Eleventh Circuit lists many of the Faretta requirements for a
waiver, but prefaces them all with a "should" rather than a
"must."77 For example, the court states that the judge should
make the defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation 78 and that there should be a pretrial inquiry
into the matter. 79 Finally, the District of Columbia Circuit has
added to the Eleventh Circuit's determination, stating that the
trial judge's decision must be made clear on the record.80
D. Competency Issues
Though competence is a major issue in the waiver debate,81
Faretta uses the word "competent" only once in the decision,
within its discussion of the competence of a defendant who is
waiving the right to counsel.8 2 In fact, the term's use comes not
74 See United States v Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that
defendant should make decision with his or her "eyes open"); United States v. Davis, 269
F.3d 514, 518 (5th Cir. 2001) (stressing that court should ensure defendant is fully aware
of decision); United States v. Martin, 790 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
defendant must make decision "knowingly and intelligibly" and must be unequivocal).
75 See Joseph, 333 F.3d at 590 (listing various factors court may consider); Davis, 269
F.3d at 518 (mentioning factors included in court's analysis of whether defendant can
appreciate his or her decision); Martin, 790 F.2d at 1218 (stating that court must consider
age and education in addition to other background information).
76 291 F.3d 726 (11th Cir. 2002).
77 See id. at 730 (noting court's discretion).
78 See United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that
defendants have right to represent themselves).
79 See Kimball, 291 F.3d at 730 (noting that pretrial inquiries are "ideal method[s]").
80 See United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that
"dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" must be made clear on record); Hsu v.
United States, 392 A.2d 972, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring clarity on record regarding
waiver of counsel); see also Brooksany Barrowes, Comment, The Permissibility of
Shackling or Gagging Pro se Criminal Defendants, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 349, 354 n.40
(1998) (noting D.C. Circuit's requirement for trial judge to ensure on record that
defendant's waiver is voluntary).
81 See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1953) (stating that conviction cannot
stand unless defendant was competent in waiving counsel); Brooks v. McCaughtry, 380
F.3d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 2004) (relating competency to stand trial with competency to
waive counsel). See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (describing issues of
competency with respect to waiver of counsel).
82 See United States v. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). The Court stated that the
record indicated that Faretta himself appeared competent. Id. In the dissent, Chief
Justice Burger states that the courts are plagued by a deficient amount of competent
attorneys. Id. at 845, and that the addition of a competent attorney is all that the Sixth
Amendment requires. Id. at 848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Corinis, supra note
25, at 283. In the context of waivers, competence refers only to the technical expertise a
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in the holding, but only in stating that Faretta himself was a
competent individual.S3 This raises the question of what level of
competence is used in waiver decisions.
In Dusky v. United States,84 the Supreme Court stated that in
order for a person to be competent to stand trial, she must have a
"present ability to consult with [her] lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding.., and.., a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against [her]."85 Later,
the Court in Godinez v. Moran86 applied this rule to those who
wish to represent themselves, holding that it does not see any
reason why a defendant who waives the right to counsel should
be held to a higher standard than those who do not.8 7
However, the Court also held that competency is not the end of
the inquiry: in a proper waiver inquiry, the trial court must also
determine whether the defendant is waiving counsel knowingly
and competently. 88  Other courts have picked up on this
trained lawyer may have. Corinis, supra note 25, at 283. The defendant's competency is
often presumed. See generally David Forestier, Jr., Project, District of Columbia Court of
Appeals Project on Criminal Procedure: VT Competency to Stand Trial, 28 HOW. L.J. 139,
151 (1985).
83 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (noting that Faretta was "literate, competent, and
understanding, and was voluntarily exercising his informed free will"); see also Anthony
J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a Defendant's
Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 75, 82 n.43 (2002) (noting that "a criminal defendant's ability to represent himself has
no bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation"); Jane L. McClellan,
Comment, Stopping the Rush to the Death House: Third-Party Standing in Death-Row
Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 201, 212 (1994) (describing "Faretta-type evaluation" as
making showing that "defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver").
84 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
85 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (holding that it is not enough that
defendants be "oriented to time and place and [have] some recollection of events").
86 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
87 See id. at 399. The court notes that defendants who are represented often face the
same kinds of decisions as defendants who represent themselves. Id. at 398. In addition,
the rights of the defendant who stands trial are the same as the defendant who pleads
guilty, including the right against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the
right to face accusers. Id. Finally, the Court holds that waiving the right to counsel does
not "require an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive
other constitutional rights," Id. at 399. Thus, there really is no difference between the
competency standard for trials and for pleas. See, e.g., Ross E. Eisenberg, The Lawyer's
Role When the Defendant Seeks Death, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 61 (2001). In this way, the
Court refuses to "differentiate varying standards of competence," unlike psychologists and
other professionals. See generally Richard E. Redding and Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative
Competence in the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 353, 359 (2001).
88 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 400-01 (1993) (noting that while inquiries into
knowledge and intelligence might lead one to claim that waiving self-representation
requires some kind of "heightened standard" of inquiry, that presumption would be
incorrect); see also Brian R. Boch, Fourteenth Amendment - The Standard of Mental
Competency to Waive Constitutional Rights Versus the Competency Standard to Stand
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statement and applied it in the trial court setting by stressing
the "knowingly" prong, but not the "competency" prong.8 9
Godinez has been met with- a wide array of criticism. 90 For
instance, some have suggested that this lower standard for
competency can lead to the absurd result of a mentally ill person
being able to represent herself.91 The Dusky standard does not
take mental competence into account, much to the ire of some
commentators. 92  However, courts in general have held in
accordance with Godinez, saying that an inquiry into one's
competency for self-representation purposes is not necessary. 9 3
Trial, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 901 (1994) (noting that heightened waiver
standards to plead guilty and stand trial exist, but only because waiver needs to be
"knowing and voluntary," not because competency standards are any higher) (quoting
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993)). But see Patricia A. Zapf and Ronald Roesch,
Mental Competency Evaluations: Guidelines for Judges and Attorneys, 37 COURT REV. 28,
32 (2000) (proposing that some defendants may be competent to stand trial in one case,
but not in others).
89 See United States v. Coomes, 106 Fed. Appx. 967, 968 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that
defendant must possess "a rational, factual understanding of the criminal proceedings
against him"); Shafer v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 637, 650 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that waiver
inquiries involve a two part inquiry: 1) whether defendant is competent to waive right to
counsel and 2) whether defendant actually "understands the consequences of a particular
decision"); Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that defendant
must have "a 'rational understanding' of the proceedings") (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389, 397-98 (1993)).
90 See David L. Shapiro, Ethical Dilemmas for the Mental Health Professional: Issues
Raised by Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 177, 178 (1997) (opining
that Godinez is contrary to prior Supreme Court decisions); Bruce J. Winick, Reforming
Competency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to
Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 619 (1995) (arguing that clinical
evaluators are afforded wide discretion in competency decisions due to Godinez); Corinis,
supra note 25, at 269 (asserting that Godinez's flaw was that it used Dusky's overly-
simplified standard).
91 See Corinis, supra note 25, at 280 (noting that Colin Ferguson's trial exemplifies
this problem); see also Pickles, supra note 57, at 624 (noting that contextual approach
should be used to determine waiver competency). See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389, 413 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that competency decisions cannot
be made in "a vacuum").
92 See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental
Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 422-
23 (1990) (arguing that competency of someone with mental illness to conduct their own
defense is "marginal at best"); see also Shelia Taub, Competency Standard Clarified,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 25 (noting that Godinez did not consider situations where
defendants are too depressed to care about what happens to them). See generally Corinis,
supra note 25, at 283-84 (suggesting that before being able to waive their right to counsel,
defendants should be required to pass competency tests).
93 See United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579, 586 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
courts must "distinguish" between defendant's competency to waive her right to counsel
and competency to "conduct" her defense, and stating that courts should not be concerned
with "whether [defendant] can survive the fall"); Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1078
n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Godinez and suggesting that inquiries into competence
should only be conducted if defendant's competency is reasonably in question). See
generally Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (concluding that one's legal
knowledge is not relevant to whether one is competent to waive her right to counsel).
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E. Introduction to Standby Counsel
Standby counsel functions to assist the pro se defendant during
trial. They must be ready to stand in for the defendant if the
defendant ceases to represent himself, and can be used by the
court to "enforce" courtroom procedures. 94 Faretta v. California
states, relying on United States v. Dougherty,95 that a court may
appoint standby counsel even over the defendant's objection. 96
However, other cases have held that standby counsel must not be
allowed to interfere with the defendant when she is providing her
own defense since doing so would erode the jury's image of the
defendant representing herself.97 In addition, even in the
presence of standby counsel, the pro se defendant has the right to
retain control over her own defense. 98 Finally, McKaskle v.
Wiggins99 states that there is no right for a defendant to have
"hybrid counsel" or an attorney that fades in and out of full
representation while the defendant is proceeding pro se. 100
94 See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184 (1984) (explaining that standby
counsel unburdens trial judge); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)(implying that standby counsel helps to prevent defendants from "[using] the courtroom
for deliberate disruption of their trials"); United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018-19
(3d Cir. 1993) (noting that standby counsel exists to protect defendants' rights and make
sure trial procedure is followed).
95 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
96 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 824 n.46 (noting that defendant may conduct his case "at
his own detriment"); see also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-26 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (holding that judges must seek to cooperate with defendants and that standby
counsel can alleviate some procedural problems). But see Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466,
469 (5th Cir. 1968) (noting that defendant has "no right to a hybrid representation partly
by himself and partly by counsel").
97 See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178 (holding that defendant retains control over her own
case); United States v. Gutierrez, 351 F.3d 897, 903 (8th Cir. 2003) (Arnold, J. dissenting)
(noting that any interference violates defendant's Sixth Amendment rights); Myers v.
Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that this principle also applies to
cases on appeal).
98 See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178 (holding that standby counsel must not interfere
with jury's impression that defendant is handling his own case); Buhl v. Cooksey, 233
F.3d 783, 802 (3d Cir. 2000) (implying that standby counsel's existence may jeopardize
defendant's right to self-representation). See generally Martinez v. Court of Appeal of
California, 528 U.S. 152, 161-62 (2000) (noting that defendant's right to represent herself
is not "absolute")."
99 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
100 See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (stating that "a defendant does
not have the constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by counsel"); see
United States v. Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding defendants do
not have "a constitutional right to 'hybrid' representation"); Barbara Zolot, Defining the
Difficult Task of Standby Counsel in Criminal Cases, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 4, 1998, at 1 (noting
that requests to have counsel perform tasks at trial may be summarily denied).
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Standby counsel has its advantages at trial simply because
most pro se defendants are "ill equipped" to handle their own
cases. 101 Counsel serving in a standby position, "can assist a
defendant about procedural matters, legal issues, and trial
strategy and tactics."102 This is useful because having a
defendant proceed pro se often results in lengthy trial delays,
disorderly procedures, and the possibility that the pro se
defendant is simply trying to manipulate the court. 103 Finally, it
is well recognized that a pro se defendant probably requires
assistance in presenting her case, and that task should not be a
burden upon the judge.104 Standby counsel fits this role, by
relieving the judge of assisting the pro se defendant. 105
However, the presence of standby counsel can also have its
disadvantages. Some commentators argue that having counsel
standing by means that the pro se defendant will not be able to
present her own defense and use her own tactics.10 6 This
101 See Colquitt, supra note 57, at 72 (noting that attorneys are simply more familiar
with trial procedure and rules). See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834
(1975) (observing that defendants are often "unskilled" at self-representation); Randall B.
Bateman, Comment, Federal and State Perspectives on a Criminal Defendant's Right to
Self-Representation, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 77, 110 (1994) (implying that standby counsel can
assist defendants on procedural matters).
102 Colquitt, supra note 57, at 72 (discussing reasons why appointing standby counsel
is necessary to help ill-equipped pro se litigants). See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of
Standby Counsel in Criminal Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the Criminal Justice System,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 676, 678 (2000) (stating that standby counsel "should not view
themselves as a passive resource").
103 See Colquitt, supra note 57, at 64 (noting that concern for orderly administration
of justice is sometimes impeded by pro se defendants who are unassisted by counsel);
Poulin, supra note 102, at 677-78 (suggesting that judges might see self-representation as
"dilatory" tactic). See generally United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1982)
(holding that plaintiff's actions in firing standby counsel and replacing them with full
counsel was meant to mislead court).
104 See Colquitt, supra note 57, at 69 (noting that judges need to remain impartial
during trials): Poulin. supra note 102. at 677 (noting "[clourts often provide standby
counsel to alleviate the burden of presiding over the trial of a pro se criminal defendant
and possibly to avert an unfair trial"); Williams, supra note 46, at 805 (positing that
appointing standby counsel relieves judge of appearance of lack of impartiality which
results when judge instructs pro se defendant on legal procedure and right against self-
incrimination).
105 See Colquitt, supra note 58, at 71-72 (suggesting that, as opposed to judges,
standby counsel can appropriately intervene when pro se defendant requires assistance
putting on case); Poulin, supra note 103, at 735 (concluding that standby counsel can be
used by judges to ensure fairness and relieve burdens on judges); see also Williams, supra
note 46, at 794 (explaining that standby counsel can also be useful for pro se litigant who
later decides he wants to be represented by counsel).
106 See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984) (holding that pro se defendant
is entitled to keep control over his own trial); Colquitt, supra note 57, at 73 (suggesting
that control is major issue); Williams, supra note 46, at 806-07 (noting that defendant
feels he is losing his rights when working with standby counsel).
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suggests that standby counsel, whose role in these cases is
sometimes amorphous, must defer to the wishes of the defendant,
no matter how bad they might be.107 Most of the problems with
standby counsel relate to the decision of the trial court to appoint
counsel.l0 Finally, the right to waive counsel can be "effectively
denied" if appointed standby counsel interfere in the pro se
defendant's case in any way.109 Thus, while standby counsel can
benefit the defendant, problems may cause "animosity between
standby counsel and the defendant."110
II. THE NEED FOR A BETTER STANDARD OF INQUIRY
A. The Current Standard of Inquiry
In dicta, Faretta stated that the defendant "relinquishes, as a
purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated
with the right to counsel."111 The Court stated that the
defendant, in order to properly represent himself, does not need
to have the knowledge of a lawyer.112 In addition, in North
107 See Colquitt, supra note 57, at 73 (implying standby counsel might end up wasting
time); Poulin, supra note 102, at 676 (noting that standby counsel occupies an
"uncomfortable twilight zone of law"); Williams, supra note 46, at 807 (hypothesizing that
standby counsel situation is problematic because many attorneys do not want to sit idly
by and because more intervention by attorneys might deprive defendant of right to
represent himself).
108 See Poulin, supra note 102, at 686 (discussing varied problems that arise during
appointment of standby counsel). See generally Colquitt, supra note 57, at 73 (positing
that there may also be problem of inequity in the very assigning of standby counsel since
indigent pro se defendants are more likely than wealthy pro se defendants to have
standby counsel); Williams, supra note 46, at 804 (describing need to explain to standby
counsel that defendant has elected to represent himself and that too much "help" may
deprive defendant of his right to represent himself).
109 See Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that denying pro
se defendant access to trial transcripts constitutes substantial interference); see also
Poulin, supra note 102, at 678 (explaining how courts must walk fine line between a
defendant's right to representation and his right to represent himself when appointing
standby counsel); Williams, supra note 46, at 804 (noting that mere appointment of
standby counsel does not offend defendant's right to self-representation, but that this
right may be infringed if standby counsel is subsequently too helpful to defendant).
110 Williams, supra note 46, at 807 (suggesting that right to fair trial can be infringed
when defendant feels she is losing control over her own defense).
Ill Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
112 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (noting one can competently represent himself
without expertise of lawyer). But see Colquitt, supra note 58, at 66-67 (noting that self
representation is fraught with dangers, thus judge instructing defendant on right to self
representation must make sure that defendant understands all perils involved); Poulin,
supra note 103, at 677 (finding that most often pro se representation creates disorder in
court due to defendant's lack of knowledge of courtroom etiquette and law).
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Carolina v. Butler,113 the Court stated that waiver decisions
must be based on a case's facts and circumstances. 114 This
follows Johnson v. Zerbst,115 which states that the
"determination of whether there has been an intelligent
waiver.., must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts
and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused." 116 Finally,
this opinion is repeated later in Edwards v. Arizona,117 which
suggests a totality of circumstances test.118 As a whole, the
Circuit Courts are in agreement that the totality of
circumstances test should be used in determining waiver
validity.119
B. The Benefits of the Totality of Circumstances Standard
Totality of circumstances jurisprudence is primarily based on
the desire to abandon a mechanistic test for waiver validity. 120 In
113 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
114 See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (holding that oral waiver of
right to counsel may be knowing and intelligent and suffice in form to constitute waiver of
right to counsel). But see Colquitt, supra note 57, at 65-66 (discussing waiver of counsel
process as "exceedingly delicate"); Williams, supra note 46, at 800 (noting that courts have
developed "detailed and exacting test" to determine if there has been effective waiver).
115 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
116 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
117 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that defendant who was advised of his rights and
then began to incriminate himself without counsel present had not necessarily made
knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights).
118 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (noting waiver decisions must
be based on defendant's "background, experience, and conduct"); Dallio v. Spitzer, 343
F.3d 553, 563 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting Supreme Court's suggestion that the totality of
circumstances test is appropriate for deciding whether defendant has waived his right to
counsel); United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2003) (listing age,
education, background, experience, and conduct as relevant factors in determining
whether accused has voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to assistance of
counsel).
119 See Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 (noting that Supreme Court mandated that these
decisions should be based on "totality of circumstances"); see also Joseph, 333 F.3d at 590
(listing personal characteristics important for determining effective waiver); United
States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 730-31 (11th Cir. 2002) (considering eight factors
weighed in waiver situations); United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir. 1988)
(stating that judges need only make determinations based on record as whole); Maynard
v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that decision turns on all
circumstances of case).
120 See North Carolina v. Butler, 411 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (noting question of waiver
is not "one of form"); see also Dallio, 343 F.3d at 563 (cautioning against use of mechanical
formulas in determining constitutional waivers); Gallop, 838 F.2d at 110 (explaining that
totality approach replaces 'formalistic' inquiry).
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Adams v. United States ex rel McCann,121 Justice Frankfurter
stated that the competence of a defendant cannot be determined
by a simple set of rules for the court to follow. 122 In that case, the
Court considered the prosecution's position that a defendant's
competence can be determined simply by holding that one who
has pled guilty, without seeking an attorney's opinion, is per se
incompetent.123 The Court reasoned that validating such a
requirement would be a "gratuitous dislocation of the processes of
justice."124 Similar reasoning, which takes the defendant's rights
into consideration, was used in Riggins v. Nevada125 where the
Supreme Court stated that the relationship between the
defendant and counsel can be affected when the defendant has
been medicated.126 This is a fact that would not be considered if a
rigid rule for determining a defendant's competency had been
used. Further, in United States v. Hayes,127 the Ninth Circuit
stated that implementing a rigid rule for the purpose of
highlighting the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation to the defendant is unwise, 128 reasoning that the
court cannot become a source of "tutelage and legal advice" for
the defendant.X29 The court emphasized that the explanation
121 317 U.S. 269 (1942). McCann, on trial for mail fraud, stated that his familiarity
with the complicated facts of his case was such that no attorney could provide as
proficient a representation as he himself could. See id. at 270.
122 Id. at 277 (announcing that question in each case must rest on exercise of
intelligent and informed judgment).
123 See id. at 276-79 (discussing issue of whether accused can waive his trial as pro se
litigant). See generally Bateman, supra note 101, at 90-91 (explaining Adams Court found
right to proceed pro se); Jeffrey P. Willhite, Note, Rethinking the Standards for Waiver of
Counsel and Proceeding Pro se in Iowa, 78 IOWA L. REV. 205, 210 (1992) (analyzing issues
set forth in Adams).
124 Adams, 317 U.S. at 277 (holding that Constitution could not force accused to
stand trial against his wishes).
125 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
126 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1992) (noting expert testimony as to
effects of medication is not enough to overcome taint on defendant's relationship with his
client); See Willis v. Cockrell, No. P-01-CA-20, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15950 at *47 (W.D.
Tex. 2004) (discussing that medication affected defendant's ability to assist in his defense
in violation of his right to counsel). But see United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876,
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that medication may not interfere with fair trial where it
improves client's mental function).
127 231 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2000).
128 See United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (implying such a
warning can be "lengthy and pedantic," yet sufficient as an explanation of dangers of self-
representation still must be given). See generally Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1119
(9th Cir. 2000) (refusing to apply rigid rule); U.S. v. Keen, 104 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir.
1996) (stating "we have never demanded an ironclad approach to this situation").
129 See McKaskle v. Wiggins 465 U.S. 168, 183-84 (1984) (noting that judges are not
required to take over chores normally performed by counsel); see also Faretta v.
2005] MAKING FARETTA v. CALIFORNIA WORK PROPERLY 265
"should not be as complex... as is now required in the taking of
a guilty plea,"130 potentially further confusing the defendant.
The benefits of the totality of circumstances approach is best
highlighted by the disadvantages of a rigid rule on how to
question potential pro se defendants. Any kind of "mechanistic"
approach to the waiver question invites restrictions on the
judge's ability to be flexible.131 In fact, it is likely that the
defendant can simply memorize the answers to waiver questions,
thus making it difficult for the judge to determine which
defendants are being disingenuous.132 Some sources state that
having a rigid rule in place would save the judge from such
hazards as trying to determine whether a waiver is valid from an
ambiguous record.133 However, even if questioning with a rigid
format must be used, the analysis must take into account such
factors as the defendant's experience, age, and conduct to make
the preliminary decision as to whether she is competent.134
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975) (holding defendant's lack of technical legal
knowledge as irrelevant); Hayes, 231 F.3d at 1138 (explaining judge should not become
surrogate lawyer for defendant).
130 United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
131 See Gallun, supra note 14, at 601 (discussing potential dangers of "mechanistic"
approach, rejecting "record as a whole" approach, and recommending rigid rules for
determining defendant's competency); Recent Case, Second Circuit Holds That the Sixth
Amendment Does Not Clearly Require Judges to Warn Defendants About the Risks of
Proceeding Pro se, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1725, 1732 (2004) (noting 'flexibility' of "totality of
the circumstances" approach) [hereinafter Second Circuit]. See generally Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (explaining that detailed inquiry is permitted by "totality of
the circumstances" approach).
132 See Dortch v. State, 651 So.2d 154, 158 (Fla. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1995) (Barfield, J.,
dissenting) (warning that defendants will respond with "intelligence of an amoeba" to
litany), overruled by Potts v. State, 718 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1998). See generally Tuitt v. Fair,
822 F.2d 166, 175 (1st Cir. 1987) (fearing courts will be "whipsawed" by wry defendants
who "record an unequivocal response" to engage in self-representation, relying on error
despite ruling); Gallun, supra note 14, at 568 (noting various dangers involved in
"mechanistic" approach).
133 See Tuitt, 822 F.2d at 176 (surmising that lack of specific warnings has increased
abuse of 'claimed deprivations' on appeal); see also Willhite, supra note 123, at 217 (noting
manipulation of silent record); Wright, supra note 16, at 802 (explaining that appellate
courts will no longer have to speculate on defendant's waiver).
134 See Von Molkte v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948) (holding that trial court must
engage in "penetrating" session of questioning when determining waiver validity); see
also United States. v. Ross, 503 F.2d 940, 945 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting pivotal role of judge
in exercising penetrating interrogation); Wright, supra note 16, at 795 (acknowledging
that these characteristics are harder to take into account when utilizing standardized
inquiry).
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C. Universal Acceptance of the Test
The totality of circumstances test has been used with approval
in Sixth Amendment cases concerning issues other than waiver
of counsel.135 In Strickland v. Washington,13 6 the Supreme Court
held that when a convicted defendant wishes to claim ineffective
trial counsel, the Court must find that the attorney's actions
were far outside the range of competence.137 This is done by
taking into account different circumstances surrounding
counsel's actions.138 The Court, in these situations, considers the
counsel's actions in light of prevailing norms, with a strong
presumption in favor of counsel's actions. 139 The Court has also
implied that a totality of circumstances test should be used to
135 See Mark C. Grafenreed, Note, The Role of Jury Discrimination in Sixth
Amendment Impartiality: Truth or Myth?, 28 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 289, 290 (2003) (noting
application of 'totality of the circumstances' test to determine violations of defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial); Rob A. Justman, Note, The Effects of AEDPA and
IIRIRA on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Claims for Failure to Advise Alien Defendants
of Deportation Consequences of Pleading Guilty to an 'Aggravated Felony" 2004 UTAH. L.
REV. 701, 724 (2004) (discussing application of 'totality of the circumstances' test to
ineffectiveness of counsel); Amanda N. Montague, Comment, Recognizing All Critical
Stages in Criminal Proceedings: The Violation of the Sixth Amendment by Utah in Not
Allowing Defendants the Right to Counsel at Parole Hearings, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 249, 257
(2003) (explaining Court's rationale for finding 'totality of the circumstances' as key
reason line-ups violate Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
136 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
137 See Florida v. Nixon, 125 S.Ct. 551, 563 (2004) (holding that if counsel's strategy
fulfills Strickland standard in capital case, where counsel analyzes guilt and penalty
phases in determining best way to proceed, claim of ineffective counsel would be
unavailable); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (indicating that
determinative factor of ineffectiveness "must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result."). But see Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 974 (9th
Cir. 2004) (rejecting use of Strickland standard in civil immigration context).
138 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681 (noting circumstances taken into account include
"the experience of the attorney, the inconsistency of unpursued and pursued lines of
defense, and the potential for prejudice from taking an unpursued line of defense."); see
also Deborah Cirilla, Note, A Caribbean Fantasy? The Case of the Juror who Misbehaved
and the Attorney Who Let Him Get Away With It: Violation of Sixth Amendment Right to
an Impartial Jury and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Weatherwax, 47 VILL. L. REV. 275, 275 n.1 (1997) (discussing right to effective
counsel and noting that ineffective assistance of counsel decision is made based upon
totality of circumstances); Levinson, supra note 18, at 155 (discussing court's examination
of defendant's burden of proof and determination that outcome probably would have been
different but for attorney's errors).
139 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (arguing that highly deferential review of
attorney's actions is necessary due to defendant's temptation to doubt attorney's
performance after adverse ruling has occurred); see also Lissa Griffin, The Correction of
Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L. REV. 1241, 1273-74
(2001) (commenting on deference afforded to counsel's performance and on how
Strickland standard is ineffective); Levinson, supra note 18, at 155 (suggesting court's
reviewing power must begin with presumption in favor of attorney).
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determine whether a confession was brought on coercively.140 In
Spano v. New York,141 the Court noted that the defendant was
subjected to fatigue, as his questioning began in the evening,
continued through the night, and was conducted by powerful
figures (both public and private) such as the district attorney,
several detectives, a police lieutenant, an inspector, and a
childhood friend of the defendant.142 Finally, in Hatfield v.
State,143 the Arkansas Supreme Court found that - in situations
involving standby counsel - whether such counsel has risen to
the level of regular counsel is determined by using a totality of
circumstances analysis.144
The totality of circumstances test has been used in other
constitutional circumstances as well.145 It has been used, for
140 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323-24 (1959) (noting that defendant's
confession cannot withstand Fourteenth Amendment challenge); see also Hopkins v.
Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584-85 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding procedures used to obtain
confession met level reached in Spano when observed under totality of circumstances, yet
allowing confession due to overwhelming circumstantial evidence), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
968 (2003); United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264, 1275 (8th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing
defendant in Spano by examining totality of circumstances and finding defendant was not
overtly coerced).
141 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
142 Id. at 322-23. Defendant was represented by counsel at the time of the interview,
but was left alone with the interrogators with instructions to tell them nothing without
his attorney present. Id. at 317. The defendant apparently followed his attorney's advice,
and only began to reveal information when being questioned by his friend Bruno. Id. at
317-19.
In United States v. Muzychka, 725 F.2d 1061, 1065 (3d Cir.1984), defendant was
arrested for possession of illegal drugs, but was neither arraigned nor provided with a
preliminary hearing on the drug charge until after the officer had already elicited
information from him. Id. The defendant's motion to suppress was consequently denied.
Id.
The court in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 201-03 (1964), found
differently, however. Here, the defendant, who had obtained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty,
was released on bail, and was then caught making numerous incriminating statements to
another man involved with the crimes at issue through use of a wiretap arranged by an
agent who then used such testimony at trial. Id. His motion to suppress was granted. Id.
143 57 S.W.3d 696 (Ark. 2001).
144 See id. at 703 (announcing that for defendants to be deemed to have counsel,
"assistance must be substantial, such that counsel was effectively conducting a defense").
See generally Taylor v. State, 75 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Ark. 2002) (setting forth that assistance
by stand-by counsel can rise to sufficient level where assertion of involuntary waiver of
right to counsel is mooted); Oliver v. State, 918 S.W.2d 690, 693-94 (Ark. 1996) (holding
that defendant was denied right to counsel and that such counsel provided effective
assistance).
145 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (discussing use of totality of
circumstances test to determine if valid Miranda waiver exists); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (noting that when certain circumstances such as deprivation of
counsel and eliciting of incriminating statements are present, such statements cannot be
admitted at trial); Lucero v. State, 91 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. 2002) (Quinn, J., concurring)
(concluding that totality of circumstances test determines whether defendant was coerced
into waiving Fifth Amendment rights when taking stand in court).
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instance, to determine whether an interrogation of a juvenile was
proper, where the issue was whether the juvenile waived his
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.146 In
Fare v. Michael C., the defendant, a juvenile, was questioned in
connection with a murder.147 At the time of his questioning, he
requested to see his probation officer. 148 When that request was
denied, he incriminated himself, with regard to the murder,
without an attorney present.149 The court determined that a
totality of circumstances test should be used to determine
whether the defendant's statements should be suppressed,150and
ultimately decided that he made a free decision to waive his Fifth
Amendment rights. 151 Additionally, when officers are allowed to
take into consideration the characteristics of their surroundings
when determining whether a situation is suspicious enough to
justify an arrest, the totality of the circumstances test is at
work.152  Finally, in Florida v. Bostick,153  a totality of
circumstances test was used to determine whether a police officer
146 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (concluding that totality of
circumstances test is appropriate in determining whether waiver has been provided by
juvenile by looking at juvenile's age, education, background, intelligence, capacity to
understand warnings issued, nature of Fifth Amendment rights, and consequences
resulting from waiver of such rights); see also Gachot v. Stadler, 298 F.3d 414, 418-19
(5th Cir. 2002) (stating totality of circumstances approach is applicable to juvenile waiver
issues); Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir.2002) (finding totality of
circumstances test applicable to both juveniles and adults in evaluating voluntary nature
of confessions made).
147 See Michael C., 442 U.S. at 710 (noting that respondent had been on probation for
more than four years when he was taken into custody for questioning due to numerous
previous offenses including burglary of guns and purse snatching).
148 Id. at 710 (noting that full disclosure of Miranda rights had occurred prior to
questioning).
149 Id. at 711 (detailing how respondent was fully aware that he was providing
answers to police questions without his attorney present).
150 Id. at 725 (considering totality of circumstances involved with investigation at
issue to determine whether respondent provided knowing and voluntary waiver of
Miranda rights during questioning).
151 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1979) (concluding that Juvenile Court
holding was proper because interrogators properly ensured that Miranda rights were
comprehended by respondent in relation to his questioning and that no additional factors,
such as respondent's age, prohibited him from such comprehension).
152 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (finding officers are permitted to
consider "relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances
are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation"); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 147 (1972) (holding that officers can take into consideration their personal
observations as well as tips provided by informant); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1968) (noting central inquiry in search and seizure case is the circumstances of invasion
at issue).
153 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
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had properly communicated to a person that they were not at
liberty to ignore a police order. 154
III. WARNING THE DEFENDANT OF THE DANGERS AND
DISADVANTAGES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
Case law has made it clear that a waiver of counsel involves
the deprivation of serious constitutional rights. United States v.
Vonn155 provides an illustration of this point. In Vonn, the
Supreme Court stated that when it comes to a plea hearing
under the Federal Rules Criminal Procedure Rule 11,156 any
deviation from the requirements of the rule, when not dealing
with a defendant's substantial rights, is subject to harmless error
doctrine; meaning that the government has the opportunity to
show that the deviation did not affect the defendant's substantial
rights to the extent that the deviation requires reversal.157
However, when the deviation affects the defendant's substantial
rights, plain error doctrine must be used.158 One of the
procedures stated in Rule 11 is that the judge, where the
defendant is not represented by counsel, must advise the
154 See id. at 437 (noting simple refusal to cooperate does not give police officer
reason to detain someone absent other suspicious circumstances); see also Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988) (noting that any seizure involving Fourth
Amendment requires application of totality of circumstances test); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (concluding "that a person has been 'seized' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave").
155 535 U.S. 55 (2002).
156 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h) (reading "[a] variance from the requirements of this
rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights").
157 See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002) (explaining government has
burden of showing defendant's substantial rights were not affected); United States v.
Jimenez-Dominguez, 296 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that "[tihe harmless error
standard, which imposes the burden upon the government to show that the error had no
effect on the defendant's substantial rights, applies to any transgression of Rule 1 raised
before the trial court"). See generally FED. R. CR1M. P. 52(a) (stating that "[alny error,
defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded").
158 See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 62-63 (stating that "[w]hen an appellate court considers
error that qualifies as plain, the tables are turned on demonstrating the substantiality of
any effect on a defendant's rights"); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736
(1993) (noting courts should correct a plain error that causes conviction or sentencing of
innocent defendant); United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (explaining
courts may notice errors "if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings").
270 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:1
defendant that she has the right to counsel.159 Since this is a
substantial right, if the defendant does not object to the fact that
it was not brought up at a plea hearing, the burden of proof is on
the defendant to show that her substantial rights were
affected.160 Thus, in choosing self-representation, the defendant
may be making it more difficult for herself when it comes time for
appeal.
Johnson v. Zerbst161 makes clear the gravity of a decision to
waive counsel. Quoting from Powell v. Alabama,162 the Court
states
The '... right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him.'163
This argument not only strongly advocates the inclusion of
counsel, but also effectively lays out every roadblock and danger
that faces the pro se defendant.164 The remainder of this Part is
159 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(D) (providing that defendant must be told she has
right to be represented by attorney); Vonn, 535 U.S. at 60 n.2 (stating pre-amended Rule
which is substantively identical, but has been moved from 11(c)(2) to 1 1(b)(1)(D)); see also
United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1079 (2d Cir. 1977) (outlining Rule 11 procedure for
addressing defendants before they accept guilty pleas).
160 See Vonn, 535 U.S. at 63 (noting that defendant who is silent at trial has burden
of showing her "substantial rights" were affected); United States v. Bevis, 46 Fed. Appx.
470, 470 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "defendant who lets a Rule 11 error pass without
objection at the trial court stage must satisfy Rule 52(b)'s plain-error rule and show that
the plain error affected his substantial rights"); see also Jimenez-Dominguez, 296 F.3d at
866 (asserting burden is on defendant to demonstrate that error affected his substantial
rights).
161 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
162 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
163 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932)).
164 See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462-63 (stating "the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to
take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned
counsel"); see also Powell, 287 U.S. at 69 (noting court's refusal to hear party by counsel
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devoted to whether a judge must warn the defendant of these
dangers, and if so, to what degree, in what setting, and what
factor should the defendant's competency play in this decision.
In relevant part, Faretta states that "[the defendant] should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open."'1 65 The
most notable instance of a mischaracterization of this statement
came in Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California,166 where the
Supreme Court, citing Faretta, stated that a court must make the
defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. 167 This problem has continued in other cases,
such as the Supreme Court's decision in Godinez v. Moran.168
Numerous Court of Appeals cases have based their decisions on
the fact that Faretta states that there should be a warning of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.1 69 It was not
until Dallio v. Spitzer170 that the Second Circuit realized the
amounts to denial of hearing and due process). See generally Wright, supra note 16, at
794 (discussing different approaches which circuits employ since Powell when warning
defendants of dangers and disadvantages in proceeding pro se).
165 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex
rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)) (emphasis added).
166 528 U.S. 152 (2000). The defendant in this case argued that he had a right to self-
representation in his appeal from a conviction for converting client money from a law firm
he was employed at, which under California's "Three Strikes" law, carried a punishment
of twenty-five years to life. Id. at 155. The Court stated that there is no right to self-
representation on an appeal, affirming the reasoning of the California Supreme Court
which stated that Faretta was based on the Sixth Amendment, whereas the right to
appeal takes into consideration due process and equal protection concerns embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
167 See id. at 162. Since the Court does not include "must" in its quotation of Faretta,
perhaps it wishes to leave its interpretation out of Faretta's meaning. See id. However,
the Court, citing to Faretta, has recently stated that "before a defendant may be allowed
to proceed pro se, he must be warned specifically of the hazards ahead." Iowa v. Tovar,
124 S. Ct. 1379, 1387 (2004). Previously, the Court suggested that judges should ensure
that defendants are made aware of these dangers and disadvantages. See Raulerson v.
Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 969 (1984).
168 509 U.S. 389, 401 (1993) (quoting Faretta in similar fashion as Martinez, leaving
term "must" outside of Faretta's words).
169 See United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 108 (2d. Cir. 1999) (suggesting that judge
and defendant "should engage in a colloquy on the record, but there is no scripted
procedure for this discussion"); United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding that trial court should make dangers and disadvantages of self-representation
known to defendant). But see United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 362 (3rd Cir. 2004)
(noting dangers and disadvantages of self-representation "must" be made known to the
defendant).
170 343 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2003).
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"should/must" problem and held that a judge does not need to
give a warning because Faretta did not strictly mandate it.171
In Dallio, the defendant, Thomas Dallio, admitted during a
police interrogation that he had murdered Loni Berglund, a
young woman residing in Forest Hills, New York. 172 Before trial,
Dallio, acting as his own attorney, requested that his
incriminating statements be suppressed.173 With standby counsel
John J. O'Grady present at his suppression hearing, Dallio
repeatedly questioned witnesses improperly.174 His request for
suppression was eventually denied on the grounds that he made
his statements knowingly and intelligently after having waived
his right to counsel.175 On a habeas corpus petition to the
Eastern District of New York, Dallio sought to get his eventual
conviction reversed on the grounds that, inter alia, he was not
advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.176 The District Court denied his motion.177
The Second Circuit, in affirming the Eastern District's decision
and Dallio's conviction, stated that Faretta's observation that a
judge should make the defendant aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation was only dictum, and that
this part of the opinion does not "constitute 'clearly established
federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court."'178 The court
171 See id. at 555 (finding such warnings are not constitutionally mandated by federal
law as prerequisite to knowing and intelligent waiver); Wilder v. Herbert, No. 03 Civ. 397,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16869, at *40 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (noting Second Circuit
established that trial judge is not constitutionally required to advise defendant about
advantages and disadvantages of self-representation); Second Circuit, supra note 131, at
1726 (suggesting court's decision in Dallio demonstrated confusion surrounding right to
counsel and self-representation).
172 Dallio v. Spitzer, 343 F.3d 553, 555-56 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting crime went unsolved
for over five years, until new computer technology matched defendant's fingerprints with
those lifted from murder scene).
173 Id. at 556 (noting Dallio told police he had committed murder in "drug-crazed"
state and that he thought it would carry charge of manslaughter rather than murder).
174 Id. at 557 (explaining how Dallio improperly questioned witness).
175 Id. at 557 (noting New York Supreme Court's prior finding that Dallio's
statements were made knowingly and voluntarily).
176 Id. at 558. Before this proceeding, Dallio through his new attorney Jonathan
Latimer, plead guilty to the murder, and a conviction was entered. Id. Dallio appealed to
the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second Department, which affirmed his
conviction. Id.
177 Dallio v. Spitzer, 343 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 2003). The district court concluded
"the trial court's failure 'to warn Dallio of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding
pro se did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the outcome of the hearing' and
that any Sixth Amendment violation was harmless error." Id. (internal citations omitted).
178 Id. at 561-62 (discussing force of relevant Supreme Court precedent in Faretta).
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then embarked on a semantic journey ending in the decision that
the term "should," as used by the Supreme Court in Faretta, does
not constitute a "legal mandate."179 In addition, the Second
Circuit cited cases such as Adams v. United States ex rel
McCann180 and Edwards v. Arizona181 to show that the Supreme
Court cautions against using an prophylactic rule to determine
whether a waiver of self-representation is valid.' 8 2 Thus, the
court stated that the case cannot be remanded simply because a
warning was not given, basing its decision on its belief that the
totality of the circumstances involved in Dallio's waiver is
paramount.183
One must take into account, however, that Dallio was
determined in the context of a suppression hearing and a plea
allocution,184 neither of which is a trial, which was the concern in
Faretta.185 Therefore, Dallio is distinguishable. This case was
also decided one year before the Supreme Court's decision
concerning a plea hearing in Iowa v. Tovar.186 In that case, the
179 Id. at 562 (noting "shall" is used in legal terms as imperative and despite fact that
"should" is simply past tense of "shall," "should" is merely suggestive).
180 317 U.S. 269 (1942). The Court held that a waiver of the right to counsel must be
made freely and intelligently. See id. at 281.
181 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Here, defendant's statement did not amount to waiver of the
right to counsel, see id. at 482.
182 See Dallio v. Spitzer,, 343 F.3d 553, 563 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting how Supreme Court
rejects strict tests that do not take into account totality of facts); see also Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (noting that applicable standard to determine whether
waiver is correctly given requires "knowing and intelligent relinquishment or
abandonment" of right); Adams v. United States ex. rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280-81
(1942) (explaining how defendant has natural right to present his case without aid of
counsel, provided his choice to do so is made "freely and intelligently").
183 See Dallio, 343 F.3d at 564-65 (holding state court's rejection of Dallio's waiver
claim to be within federal law); see also United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir.
1999) (emphasizing district courts are not bound by specific guidelines for finding waiver
of council from a defendant); United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1191-92 (2d Cir. 1993)
(explaining procedure and coinciding concerns accompanying waiver of counsel by
defendant).
184 See Dallio, 343 F.3d at 556, 558 (stating that Dallio plead guilty after failing to
succeed on suppression motion and on keeping inculpatory statements out of court); see
also Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 621 (6th Cir. 2001) (addressing limitations on
defendant's ability to waive counsel at suppression hearing); Henderson v. Frank, 155
F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating defendant can waive his right to counsel at a
suppression hearing if waiver is "voluntary, knowing and intelligent").
185 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 811 (1975) (noting pre-appeal discourse
between judge and defendant whereby defendant was denied the right to represent
himself at trial); see also People v. Sharp, 499 P.2d 489, 498-99 (Cal. 1972) (holding
California state constitution not to guarantee defendants right to appear pro se). See
generally CAL. CONST. of 1849, app. I, Art. I, § 8 (2005) (declaring accused in California
criminal prosecution has right "to appear and defend in person and with counsel").
186 541 U.S. 77 (2004) The Court held here that states are free to adopt as they see fit
guidelines for the acceptance of an uncounseled plea. Id. at 94.
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Court held that the State of Iowa did not need to make sure that,
first, defendant Tovar knew of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation and, second, that there were defenses to his
charges of which he may not have be aware. 187 While making its
decision, Tovar held that the court does not need to provide a
warning at the stages before trial. 188 The Court speculated,
however, that this is not true at trial, because a trial is more
complicated and Faretta mandates a warning at trial.18 9 This
case seems to make Dallio inapplicable to the case at hand.
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama 90
states, essentially exactly as is stated in Tovar, that "at trial,
counsel is required to help even the most gifted layman adhere to
the rules of procedures and evidence," suggesting that a warning
must be given.191 A mandated warning was espoused by the
Eighth Circuit in at least three cases. 192 Finally, Justice
187 In Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 91 (2004), the court states:
[Tihe trial judge [must] advise the defendant generally that there are defenses to
criminal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the danger in
waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to plead guilty is the risk that a
viable defense will be overlooked .... [and] ... [tihe defendant should be admonished
that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an
independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to
plead guilty.
Id. District courts are not bound by specific guidelines for acquiring waiver of council
from defendants. See Fore, 169 F.3d at 107. There "is also no "talismanic procedure" to
find waiver. See Torres v. United States, 140 F.3d 392, 401 (2d Cir. 1998). The record as
a whole must only must show defendant waived right knowingly and intelligently. Id.
188 See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89 (stating that less "searching or formal colloquy" is
required when defendant waives his right to counsel prior to trial) (quoting Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988)); see also Patterson, 487 U.S. at 299 (noting "more formal
and searching inquiry" is necessary before allowing a defendant to waive his right to
counsel at trial than at post-indictment, pre-trial questioning). See generally Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (stating waiver of right to counsel must embody
"intentional relinquishment and abandonment of a known right" even at pretrial stages)
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
189 See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89 (emphasizing warning must be "rigorously conveyed" at
trial due to complexities of trial (quoting Patterson, 487 U.S. at 299)); see also Charles H.
Whitebread, The Rule of Law, Judicial Self.Restraint, and Unanswered Questions:
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court's 2003-2004 Term, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 101,
130-32 (2004) (discussing waiver of right to counsel at trial and noting some form of
warning of dangers associated with such waiver is required by trial courts). See generally
Decker, supra note 17, at 514-17 (examining how circuits have applied requirement of
warning more or less stringent depending on factual circumstances).
190 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
191 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 89 (2004) (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285,
299 n. 13 (1988).
192 See Young v. Lockhart, 892 F.2d 1348, 1352 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding "to constitute
a valid waiver of counsel, the trial judge must apprise the defendant on the record of the
advantages and disadvantages of self-representation"); Berry v. Lockhart, 873 F.2d 1168,
1170 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting court should determine based on what point trial is at what
warnings are needed to apprise defendant of her rights); Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110,
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Thurgood Marshall in a dissent from a denial of certiorari in
Raulerson v. Wainwright193 stated that a court must assure that
a warning as to the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation be given.194 All of this authority seems to counsel
that the "should" must be changed to a definitive "must".
As mentioned above, Iowa v. Tovar stated that trials are much
more complicated than plea hearings.195 In this context, a
warning would be highly beneficial to a defendant. However,
probably the best reason to mention the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation comes from Martinez v.
Court of Appeal of California.196 There, the Court stated that a
pro se defense is almost never a good one, and that the results
are comparatively worse than those realized when experienced
counsel is used.197 In addition, the totality of circumstances
approach, while it is a beneficial approach, allows more
defendants to waive their rights, creating the need for more
appeals.198 As Martinez suggests, a distinct warning would allow
defendants the time to take in these risks and permit them to
make a more reasoned decision.
1116 (8th Cir. 1988) (espousing agreement with Arkansas courts, which note that
warning is preferable, but adding that it may be disposed with if record shows that
defendant does not require such warning).
193 469 U.S. 966 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
194 See id. at 966. Though, as in Martinez, the word "must" is handled outside of a
quote from Faretta, it is clear in these cases that the Justices, even twenty-five years after
Faretta, interpret the term "should" to operate the same as "must."
195 See 541 U.S. 77, 90 (2004) ("We require less rigorous warnings pretrial, Patterson
explained, not because pretrial proceedings are 'less important' than trial, but because, at
that stage, 'the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation .... are less
substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial"') (quoting Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988)).
196 528 U.S. 152 (2000). See supra note 166 and accompanying text for the facts of
this case.
197 See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (stating "it
is reasonable to assume that counsel's performance is more effective [when unskilled]
than what the unskilled [defendant] could have provided for himself'); see also Decker,
supra note 17, at 598 (hypothesizing that self-representation is generally a bad idea);
Kenneth S. Sogabe, Note, Exercising the Right to Self-Representation in United States v.
Farhad: Issues in Waiving a Criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 30
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 150 (2000) (noting that Martinez represents "shift in the
Court's application of Farett a").
198 See Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F;2d 166, 174-76 (1st Cir. 1987) (fearing that complex
constitutional issues presented by standard may lead to more frequent trial court error
and hence more appeals); Willhite, supra note 123, at 219 (noting that defendants will
attack their convictions on Sixth Amendment grounds). See generally United States v.
McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that appeal arose from failure to
have "formal colloquy").
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The most vehement objections to a lengthy discussion of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation comes from the
Seventh Circuit. In United States v. Oreye,199 Judge Posner
stated that, "if a judge exaggerates either the advantages of
being represented or the disadvantages of self-representation, he
will be accused of having put his thumb on the scale and
prevented the defendant from making an informed choice."200
Later, Judge Posner states that a judge is limited to ensuring
only that the defendant knows his rights.201 In United States v.
Goad,202 the court proclaimed that there cannot be a hard and
fast rule in determining whether a waiver is valid, stating that
"the ultimate question is not what was said or not said to the
defendant but rather whether he in fact made a knowing and
informed waiver of counsel."203 However, each of these cases
concedes that some sort of waiver warning should be required. 204
Thus, with all this information taken together, it is reasonable to
infer that warnings should be given by the trial judge when a
defendant requests to represent herself.
IV. METHOD OF DETERMINING WAIVER VALIDITY
Faretta does not give an indication of what method should be
used to determine whether a waiver of counsel is valid, except to
say that an inquiry should be had "so that the record will
establish that '[the defendant] knows what he is doing and his
199 263 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2001).
200 United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
201 See id. (opining that 'All a judge can do as a practical matter - all a judge need do
as a legal matter - is ensure that the defendant knows his rights"') (quoting United States
v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2001)).
202 44 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1995). The defendant in this case was only briefly questioned
by the trial judge, who asked him if he understood that he would be representing himself
and that his former attorney would be acting as standby counsel. Id. at 582. After the
defendant responded in the affirmative, the judge allowed him to proceed pro se. Id.
203 United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580, 587 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 734 (7th Cir. 1988).
204 In Oreye, Judge Posner infers that some kind of warning is necessary when he
states that though the warnings given in this case were short, they satisfied the
requirement that the judge ensures "that the defendant knows his rights and avoids hasty
decisions." Oreye, 263 F.3d at 672. In Goad, the court states that the defendant must be
made aware of the advantages of being represented by counsel and the pitfalls of
representing oneself at trial, warning about "the fact that it is unwise for one not trained
in the law to try to represent himself." Goad, 44 F.3d at 586. However, in Iowa v. Tovar,
77 (2004), the Court states that the trial court merely needs to "inform" the accused of
nature of plea, right to counsel, and possible punishments. Id. at 81.
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choice is made with eyes open."' 205 The only other guidance that
one can garner from the decision is the actual determination the
court made with regard to Faretta.206 When stating that Faretta
should not have had an attorney forced upon him, the Court
stated that the record showed Faretta was "literate, competent,
and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his
informed free will."207 From this, it could be determined that a
decision of waiver validity can be made simply from the record.
Thus, two generally accepted methods of determining waiver
validity have come about: the record approach and the formal
inquiry approach.20 8
A. The Record Approach
The record approach does not require a district court to hold an
inquiry into the defendant's qualifications for asserting a waiver
of counsel. 209 This approach requires that the trial judge develop
the record as a whole to determine whether a defendant should
be able to proceed without counsel. 210 This approach has been
205 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). The Court here further states that the defendant
does not need to have the skill of an attorney to represent himself, only that he must
know what he is getting himself into. See id.
206 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36 (holding that it was improper of judge to tell
Faretta that it was bad idea not to take counsel and that he would be held to rules of
Court). See generally Gallun, supra note 14, at 565 (pointing out that trial judges have not
adopted universal standard that satisfactorily warns defendant of harm in proceeding pro
se); Pickles, supra note 56, at 607 (noting how Court was silent as to applicable test for
finding competency in self-representation).
207 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
208 See Second Circuit, supra note 131, at 1725 (noting split among Federal courts of
appeals over whether defendants are entitled to express warnings of dangers of
proceeding pro se or if judge determines for himself whether defendant has made choice
knowingly and willingly); Wright, supra note 16 at 794 (giving two kinds of inquiry
methods and authority that supports them); Gallun, supra note 14, at 601 (noting trial
courts either use "record as a whole" or "formal inquiry" approach, depending on what law
the jurisdiction favors).
209 See Wright, supra note 16, at 794 (stating hearing conducted by judge is not
required to determine validity of waiver); see also Gallun, supra note 14, at 569
(highlighting how "record as a whole" approach allows judge to decide whether to conduct
inquiry or to forego one); Rieder, supra note 42, at 141-42 (stating defendant must be
informed of costs of proceeding pro se).
210 See United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting features
such as defendant's education, age, and general competence should be taken into account
in record. review); Wright, supra note 16, at 794 (recognizing that judge determines
whether defendant is able to proceed pro se); see also Gallun, supra note 14, at 567-68
(stating that judges need to make it known to defendant whether self-representation is
good idea).
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used by a number of the circuits,211 and was approved of by the
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst.21 2
Various states have also noted that the record approach is a
beneficial approach for waiver decisions. 213 For instance, the
court in People v. Providence21 4 held that when a reviewing court
must decide whether the trial court made a proper waiver
decision, it may look to the trial record rather than simply the
inquiry engaged in by the trial judge. 21 5 This suggests that the
record may be more important than the inquiry itself.2 16
B. The Formal Inquiry Approach
Some courts and authorities favor the formal inquiry approach
over the record approach. This approach forces a trial judge to
conduct a searching, formal inquiry into the defendant's waiver
to determine if the defendant is competent enough to represent
himself. 217 The application of this approach is well stated by the
211 See United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting court
must take into account what defendant knew at time of purported waiver); Berry v.
Lockhart, 873 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting "[tihe record as a whole must be
reviewed for circumstances indicating a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel"); United States v. Pilla, 550 F.2d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 1977) (clarifying defendant
was fully aware that he would go to trial without counsel and that he did not know how to
represent himself at his criminal trial); Wright, supra note 16, at 797 (discussing circuits
which adopted record approach).
212 304 U.S. 458 (1938) Here, the court held that courts must take into account all
circumstances to see if defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver. Id. at 464.
213 See Evans v. State, 822 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (holding that court
can determine waiver validity from record in some circumstances); McClinton v. United
States, 817 A.2d 844, 855 (D.C. 2003) (holding that waiver decision should take into
consideration all circumstances on record); Cerkella v. State, 588 So.2d 1058, 1059 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that formal inquiry is not necessary where court can point to
record as evidence of defendant's ability to represent herself); see also Wright, supra note
17, at 796 (noting trial judge shall look at all surrounding circumstances when
determining whether defendant may proceed pro se).
214 813 N.E.2d 632 (N.Y. 2004).
215 See id. at 635 (stating that "reviewing court may look to whole record, not simply
to the waiver colloquy, in order to determine if a defendant effectively waived counsel").
216 As stated earlier in this paper, courts will use a totality of circumstances approach
in determining whether a waiver is valid. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 2003);
Dallio v. Spitzer, 343 F.3d 553 (2nd Cir. 2003); United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726
(11th Cir. 2002). Having the court answer questions concerning the defendant's education,
age, and character may be repetitive when the answers to these questions may already
appear in the record.
217 See Jennifer Elizabeth Parker, United States v. Goldberg: The Third Circuit's
Nontraditional Approach to Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 41 VILL. L.
REV. 1173, 1190 (1996) (discussing hearing conducted by trial judge in order to warn
defendant of dangers of proceeding pro se and to determine whether defendant understood
disadvantages and consequences); Wright, supra note 16, at 794 (noting in absence of
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Third Circuit in United States v. Salemo.218 There the court
stated that a "searching inquiry" must be made either at trial or
sentencing, though a procedure for this inquiry does not need to
follow any formalistic standards.219 In Von Moltke v. Gillies,220
the Supreme Court stated that the Court must make a
''penetrating and comprehensive examination" of the
defendant. 221 The need for a searching inquiry is obvious when
one considers that a simple review of the record is mechanistic,
and that one cannot get a complete view of the issue unless the
defendant is present to be questioned about his decision. 222
However, this is not an absolute rule. It is true that many
circuits do require some kind of searching inquiry. 223 However,
the majority of circuits, if no formal inquiry is completed, will not
reverse the case and remand to the trial court if it finds that the
record shows that a knowing and intelligent waiver has been
inquiry, court will remand case to trial court); See Gallun, supra note 14, at 568 (noting
"[tihe 'formal inquiry' approach ensures that courts take 'all reasonable steps' to inform
defendants of the consequences of waiving the Sixth Amendment right to counsel").
218 61 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1995).
219 See id. at 220 (noting defendant's waiver is effective only when district court
makes inquiry that shows voluntariness of waiver).
220 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
221 See id. at 724 (stating judge makes examination of all circumstances surrounding
defendant's plea); see also Wright, supra note 16, at 795 (opining that judge can only
make proper determination of whether waiver was made knowingly and intelligently if he
conducts formal hearing).
222 See Wright, supra note 16, at 795 (noting formal inquiry approach requires
questioning between judge and defendant, ensuring that defendant will always be told of
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation); John R. Quinn, Article: 'Attitudinal"
Decision Making in the Federal Courts: A Study of Constitutional Self-Representation
Claims, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701, 714-15 (1996) (discussing judge-conducted inquiry of
defendant to see if his request to proceed is willful); Gallun, supra note 14, at 568 (noting
that record approach can also result in defendant giving prepared answers to questions
she knows are going to be asked).
223 See McGovern, supra note 56, at 436 (suggesting that courts following formal
inquiry approach are taking cues from Supreme Court). See generally Wright, supra note
16, at 797 (discussing circuits that follow "record as a whole" approach and those that
follow formal inquiry approach); Gallun, supra note 14, at 565 (highlighting federal
appellate court split over which approach to use when deciding if defendant can proceed
in self-representation).
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made. 224 Some state courts, however, have taken the position
that a searching inquiry must be made. 225
C. The Inquiry Approach and the Warning of Dangers and
Disadvantages
Earlier in this Note, the conclusion was reached that a warning
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation should be
given at trial.226 One cannot help but notice that if a record
approach were used, there would be no opportunity for the court
to give such a warning. 227 Thus, it seems that the formal inquiry
approach is the only method that can be used to determine
waiver validity. On the other side, however, some have said that
using the formal inquiry approach introduces a standard that is
too "rigorous" for a constitutionally protected right.228 One
commentator suggests a compromise, citing the District of
Columbia's handling of the matter, which suggests that a formal
inquiry approach can still be used, but that it should consist of a
"short discussion" with the defendant rather than a full blown
224 See Parker, supra note 217, at 1187 (discussing importance of informing
defendant of dangers of self-representation); McGovern, supra note 56, at 436-38 (noting
that if there is review of record that shows that waiver was not knowing and intelligent,
reviewing court will either require reversal, or apply harmless error doctrine to see if
reversal is required). See generally Jean D'Alessandro, New York State Constitutional
Decision: 2002 Compilation: Assistance of Counsel: Court of Appeals of New York: People
v. Arroyo (Decided June 11, 2002), 19 TOURO L. REV. 201, 213 (2003) (mentioning knowing
and intelligent test).
225 See City of St. Peters v. Hodak, 125 S.W.3d 892, 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (stating
that formal inquiry is necessary "as a practical matter" and not conducting one is
"insufficient"); State v. Wiggins, 677 A.2d 800, 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(holding that that searching inquiry is necessary for reviewing court to determine
whether waiver was knowing and voluntary); People v. Smith, 705 N.E.2d 1205, 1207
(N.Y. 1998) (noting "searching inquiry" is needed to waive "fundamental right" and to
make sure that waiver is "unequivocal").
226 See supra notes 155-204 and accompanying text.
227 See Gallun, supra note 14, at 568 (noting that formal inquiry approach allows
reviewing court to automatically see if warning of self-representation's dangers and
disadvantages was given by judge). See generally Melinda A. Nicholson, Comment, The
Constitutional Right to Self-Representation: Proceeding Pro se and the Requisite Scope of
Inquiry When Waiving Right to Counsel, 79 TUL. L. REV. 755, 756 (2005) (proposing that
Supreme Court should adopt formal inquiry approach); Wright, supra note 16, at 795
(stating that formal inquiry approach will ensure defendants are apprised of dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding pro se).
228 See Wright, supra note 16, at 795 (noting that circuits that apply the formal
inquiry approach also state that trial judges should note dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation). See generally Gallun, supra note 14 at 568 (recognizing danger of
such a severely "mechanistic" approach); Reed Harvey, Note, Waiver of the Criminal
Defendant's Right to Testify: Constitutional Implications, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 196
(1991) (suggesting at minimum that courts engage in case by case inquiry rather than
record approach).
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warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. 229 This ensures that the dangers are being
discussed with the defendant, which is something that is usually
not done using the record approach, but also means that the
inquiry will not be so pervasive as to deny the defendant his
constitutional rights.230 This Note endorses the abbreviated
formal inquiry view precisely for this reason: the formal inquiry
approach makes sure the defendant, in determining whether a
waiver is knowing and intelligent, knows the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation. 23 1
V. ADMISSION OF STANDBY COUNSEL
A. Consideration of Standby Counsel in Waiver Decisions
Due to standby counsel being officially sanctioned in Faretta
and McKaskle v. Wiggins, standby counsel has become
increasingly present in waiver situations.232 The trouble comes
when courts try to decide questions of waiver validity when
229 See Wright, supra note 16, at 795 (noting two other circuits that use record
approach have also mandated that their judges warn defendants of dangers of self-
representation). See generally United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(stating that court must ensure that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent);
Parker, supra note 217, at 1190 (discussing process by which court informs defendant).
230 See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 977 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
that questioning defendant is not absolute and that all court needs to find is that waiver
is knowing and intelligent); see also Wright, supra note 16, at 794 n.71 (listing cases that
allow for record approach). See generally Nicholson, supra note 227, at 767 (discussing
courts which follow formal inquiry approach).
231 See Cooley v. English, 74 Fed. Appx. 227, 233 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that, in
formal setting, court must make defendant aware of technical problems which self-
represented litigants face); Lucero v. Kennard, 89 P.3d 175, 183 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)
(noting that defendant, in formal inquiry setting, must be made aware of risks of self-
representation). See generally Nicholson, supra note 227, at 775 (stating formal inquiry
approach should be adopted by Supreme Court so uniformity may exist between circuits).
232 See Joshua L. Howard, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law: Criminal Law:
Hybrid Representation and Standby Counsel: Let's Clear the Air for the Attorneys of South
Carolina, 52 S.C. L. REV. 851, 855 (2001) (stating that many courts have chosen to use
standby counsel to ensure procedural and evidentiary rules are followed); Meghan H.
Morgan, Article, Standby Me: Self-Representation and Standby Counsel in a Capital Case,
16 CAP. DEF. J.. 367, 368 (2004) (discussing "evolution of the phenomenon of standby
counsel"); Higgins Williams, supra note 46, at 793 (noting how judges often appoint
standby counsel to help solve problems associated with self-representation).
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standby counsel is present.233 In Florida, the District Court of
Appeals has decided that judges should give the same warnings
to defendants who have standby counsel as to those who do not
have standby counsel. 234 This is due to the fact that the court
cannot divide how much of the trial the defendant is going to
conduct himself.235 This differs from the Maryland approach,
which looks at the issue retroactively to see how much of the
defense the pro se defendant actually conducted himself.236
Taking a middle ground between these two opinions is the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Cash.237 There, the court
laid out eight factors to determine whether a proper waiver was
made, one of those being "whether standby counsel was
appointed and the extent to which that counsel aided the
defendant."238 The same approach was taken by the Rhode Island
233 The dissent in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S 806 (1975), first posited the question
as such: If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he still
have a constitutional right to assistance of standby counsel? See id. at 852 (Blackmun, J.
dissenting). This followed the majority opinion which stated that a state may appoint
standby counsel, but stopped short of saying that standby counsel was a right afforded to
the defendant. Id. at 834. Since then, some courts have stated that standby counsel does
not fulfill the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and thus, a waiver is still valid. See, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514, 520 (5th Cir. 2001). Others imply that the presence
of standby counsel can affect waiver validity. See, e.g., United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d
1083, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 1995).
234 See Dortch v. State, 651 So.2d 154, 157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (stating factors
trial court should advise defendant of, even if standby counsel is present); see also Gallun,
supra note 14, at 570 (noting that standby counsel was underlying issue throughout case).
See generally Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (holding Court can appoint standby counsel even
over defendant's objections).
235 See State v. Frye, 617 A.2d 1382, 1386 (Conn. 1992) (noting judge's difficulty in
determining waiver questions when they can not predict defendant's role in their
defense); Payne v. State, 642 So.2d 111, 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App, 1994) (stating "at the
time the trial court is faced with the request from the defendant to represent himself, the
court can not predict how much of his own defense a defendant will conduct"); see also
Gallun, supra note 14, at 570-71 (discussing Florida's interpretation of difficulty of
predicting defendant's role in his own defense).
236 See Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 614 (Md. 1987) (noting standby counsel stated,
after putting on his case, that defendant had been researching most of his defense
himself); see also Gallun, supra note 14, at 571 (stating that this retroactive approach
"forces an appellate court to study the record meticulously"). See generally Howard, supra
note 232, at 864 (discussing Maryland's approach).
237 47 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 1995). After the court allowed the defendant to represent
himself, the judge requested that one of the defendant's lawyers remain to consult with
the defendant. Id at 1089. The attorney did not give any advice to the defendant. Id.
238 United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 1995). But see, Shafer v.
Bowersox, 329 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that Eight Circuit acknowledged that
2005] MAKING FARETTA v. CALIFORNIA WORK PROPERLY 283
Supreme Court in State v. Briggs.239 However accepted in some
courts, the danger of having an overly pervasive standby counsel
is stated in Arkansas's Bledsoe v. State,240 which holds that
standby counsel can rise to the level of regular counsel. 241 If this
happens, the defendant cannot claim on appeal that she was
denied the right to counsel. 242
However, all of this can be problematic, as standby counsel is
not like the right to counsel in that there is no right to standby
counsel, leaving the trial judge with the ultimate decision of
whether to grant standby counsel. 243 Thus, the standby counsel
consideration is based on an uncertain system, and most likely
should not be included in a waiver validity inquiry.
B. Mandating Standby Counsel
One way to alleviate the problem of uncertainty in the standby
counsel system is to mandate that all criminal defendants take
court appointed standby counsel. One commentator opines that
"[m]andatory standby counsel offers a means for meeting the
these requirements existed, but chose to disregard them in favor of the vague
requirements set forth in Faretta and Von Molkte).
239 787 A.2d 479 (R.I. 2001). Here, the Rhode Island Supreme Court named this as
one of six factors to be used, though said that this was not a mandatory list. See id. at
486.
240 989 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. 1999).
241 See Bledsoe v. State, 989 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. 1999) (noting that when deciding
whether standby counsel has risen to level of regular counsel, court must use totality of
circumstances approach).
242 See Bledsoe, 989 S.W.2d at 514 (stating that aid of standby counsel can rise to
level where defendant is considered to have had counsel for his defense, thus mooting any
later assertion of involuntary waiver); see also Oliver v. State, 918 S.W.2d 690, 694
(Ark.1996) (affirming defendant's convictions and holding that defendant effectively
waived issue of denial of counsel because he did not raise it on direct appeal); Calamese v.
State, 635 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Ark. 1982) (concluding that facts of each case must be
examined in their entirety when determining whether accused has been adequately
represented).
243 See Gallun, supra note 14, at 570 (stating that standby counsel's main purpose is
to assist defendant in "routine matters" that defendant might not be able to handle on his
own). See generally Naomi Gaynor, Note, People v. Dennany: The Right to Self
Representation, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 255, 263 (1995) (asserting that "standby counsel also
ensures that the defendant complies with courtroom procedures"); Stacey A. Giulianti,
Comment, The Right to Proceed Pro se at Competency Hearings: Practical Solutions to a
Constitutional Catch-22, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 883, 909 (1993) (analyzing conflict that
arises when incompetent defendant seeks to represent himself).
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interests of all parties to the judicial process."244 In addition,
allowing standby counsel to question victims will prevent the
"unseemly" problem of defendants cross-examining victims. 245 In
addition, in People v. Joseph,246 the California Supreme Court
noted that "the state has an interest in the proceedings that
cannot be extinguished."247 Society's duty to provide fairness in a
trial and also to ensure the integrity of the proceedings militates
in favor of mandating standby counsel. 248  Furthermore,
introduction of standby counsel will facilitate judicial economy,
as the judge will no longer feel compelled to educate the
defendant on legal procedure. 249
However, one must balance this with the problems that
standby counsel presents. The largest problem is that of hybrid
representation. 250 One commentator suggests that, although
244 John H. Pearson, Comment, Mandatory Advisory Counsel for Pro se Defendants:
Maintaining Fairness in the Criminal Trial, 72 CAL. L. REV. 697, 719 (1984) (concluding
that defendants will be able to maintain control over their own defenses).
245 See Willams, supra note 46, at 811-12 (discussing cross examination of all
nineteen victims of December, 1993 Long Island Rail Road shooting at Merillon Avenue
station in Garden City, New York by self-represented litigant Colin Ferguson); see also
Stanley S. Arkin & Katherine E. Hargrove, Justice Mocked When Madman Defends
Himself, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, at M1 (assessing Colin Ferguson's pro se defense and
likelihood of his incompetence); Larry McShane, Ferguson's Trial Antics May Set Stage for
Appeal, CHI. SUN TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at 3 (describing manner by which defendant Colin
Ferguson represented himself at trial).
246 671 P.2d 843 (Cal. 1983).
247 People v. Joseph, 671 P.2d 843, 851 (Cal. 1983).
248 See Pearson, supra note 244, at 710 (noting that society's strong interests deserve
protection that counsel can afford). See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §1239(b) (West 2005)
(demonstrating that in response to society's interest in fairness and accuracy of trials,
some states have passed laws mandating automatic appeal of all death penalty cases);
Williams, supra note 46, at 795 (stating that "the American legal system aspires to
provide every criminal defendant with a fair trial").
249 See Williams, supra note 46, at 811 (stating that judges attempt "to walk the fine
line between giving free legal advice and wasting court time"); see also Laura Parker &
Gary Fields, Do-It-Yourself Law Hits Courts, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 1999, at 3A (asserting
that judges find themselves somewhere in between "giving free legal advice and allowing
an amateur litigator to tie up the courtroom"). See generally Jonathan D. Rosenbloom,
Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro se Cases: A Study of the
Pro se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 306 (2002)
(noting pro se litigants often turn to court for guidance when faced with complexities of
legal system, leaving judges and court staff feeling frustrated by litigant's inability to
grasp legal concepts or to comply with rules of civil procedure).
250 See Colquitt, supra note 57, at 77 (stating that although there is no right to hybrid
representation, courts can allow it; yet if denied, the denial will most likely be affirmed on
appeal); Williams, supra note 46, at 812 (noting that "hybrid representation only confuses
many of the parties involved and prevents that establishment of clear roles for the parties
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hybrid representation should not be allowed, it should be
permitted both when a defendant takes the stand and when a
defendant wishes to cross-examine a witness. 251 Neither one of
these possibilities is acceptable because a defendant has a right
to counsel and a right to self-representation, but not both at the
same time.252 This led the Court of Appeals of Maryland to hold
that the court cannot force public defenders into a standby
counsel role.253 In addition, mandating standby counsel still
poses the problem of animosity between the defendant and
standby counsel, as laid out earlier in this note. 254 Thus,
mandating standby counsel would cause more problems than it is
worth, and should not be recommended.
involved"). See generally McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 171(1984) (demonstrating
confusion that arises when hybrid representation is utilized).
251 See Willams, supra note 46, at 813 (arguing that "reasons of policy and
practicality make it justifiable for standby counsel to conduct the questioning"). See
generally State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 454 (R.I. 1989) (asserting notion that "where a
defendant states at an early date and in an unequivocal manner that he or she wishes to
proceed pro se, standby counsel will be appointed to conduct the examination of the child
victim"); Bateman, supra note 101, at 97 (stating that trial courts are authorized to
appoint standby counsel to help pro se litigants upon request and/or to represent litigants
if court terminates right of self-representation).
252 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 825 (1975) (stating that right to counsel
always came with right to counsel and the right to self-representation); see also Harris v.
State, 687 A.2d 970, 973 (Md. 1997) (holding that both rights cannot be invoked at same
time); Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (Md. 1987) (noting that the two rights are
mutually exclusive); Colleen Halloran, Recent Development, Harris v. State: Trial Court
Cannot Order Public Defender's Office to Appoint Standby Counsel at Pro se Defendant's
Request, 27 U. BALT. L. F. 67, 67 (1997) (stating that court in Harris "limited" its "broad
interpretation" of Faretta v. California).
253 See Harris, 687 A.2d at 977 (holding that services provided by public defender do
not include standby counsel). See generally Halloran, supra note 252 (discussing outcome
of Harris v. State and its effect on public defender's appointment as standby counsel);
Poulin, supra note 102, at 696-99 (offering analysis of role of standby counsel, including
role of Office of Public Defender).
254 See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text for discussion of potential
antagonistic relationship between pro se litigant and standby counsel. See generally
Williams, supra note 46, at 794 (assessing role that the standby counsel plays when pro se
litigant requests his or her assistance at trial); Shelly Messerli, Comment, The Poor Man's
Burden: Why Texas Should Provide Interim Counsel for Indigent Defendants When They
Request A Substitute in Their Appointed Counsel, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 157, 173-76
(2004) (analyzing several cases where pro se litigants filed motions to dismiss counsel
appointed by court because animosity developed).
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CONCLUSION
While Faretta v. California affirms the right to self-
representation and attempts, in dicta, to draw guidelines as to
how those rights are to be implemented, the questions of
warning, forums, and standby counsel remain pervasive. A
warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation
should be given, but such a warning should not be so harsh as to
scare away a defendant from the forum of self-representation.
This warning should be tailored only to make sure the defendant
is heading into the decision "knowingly and intelligently."255 In
order to facilitate this warning, the court should conduct a formal
inquiry into the validity of the defendant's waiver. Finally,
standby counsel, while helpful to the defendant, poses too many
problems for all parties involved, and should not be mandated by
the court.
Competency issues still pose problems when it comes to a
decision of waiver validity.256 The application of Godinez will
most likely be confined to the Dusky standard. However, since
Faretta lays out requirements for a waiver in addition to
competence - notably a finding that the waiver was made
"knowingly and intelligently" - distinctions will be made on a
case-by-case basis to take into account other factors that the
Dusky standard does not consider.257
255 Faretta v. California, 422, U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (explaining defendant must be
aware of rights he is relinquishing before he is allowed to represent himself at trial).
256 See Pearson, supra note 244, at 711 (discussing complicated nature of competency
with regard to pro se litigants); see also Williams, supra note 46, at 800 (analyzing
manner by which accused may invoke and relinquish his or her right to self-
representation). See generally Gallun, supra note 14 at 574-78 (assessing recent
developments with respect to right to waive counsel under Faretta).
257 See generally Boch, supra note 88, at 883 (analyzing distinction between
competency to waive one's constitutional rights and 'competency to stand trial); Grant H.
Morris, Ansar M. Haroun & David Naimark, Health Law in the Criminal Justice System
Symposium, Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 HouS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 193, 238
(2004) (discussing complexity involved in setting competency standard in criminal court
cases); Pickles, supra note 56, at 632 (assessing likelihood of finding ultimate competency
standard).
